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SECTION 16(b) AND "EXTRAORDINARY" TRANSACTIONS:
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AND STOCK OPTIONSt
Robert Todd Lang* and Melvin Katz**
I. Introduction
Forty years have passed since the enactment of Section 16(b) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934,' a remedial measure designed to remove the profit in-
centive from insider trading. Section 16(b) provides that any profit realized
during a six-month period by statutory insiders (officers, directors and the
holders of more than 10% of a class of equity securities) from any combination
of purchase and sale2 of the issuing corporation's equity securities must be dis-
gorged to the issuer. The statute applies to each issuer which has one or more
classes of equity securities listed on a national securities exchange or registered
under Section 12 (g) of the Exchange Act.'
* Attorney at Law, New York City; A.B., LL.B., Yale.
** Attorney at Law, New York City; A.B., Wesleyan; LL.B., Harvard.
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance and contributions of Simeon
Gold (B.S., Cornell; J.D., Harvard) and Glen Schaeffer (B.B.A., Baruch College; J.D., New
York University) in the preparation of this article. The authors also express their gratitude
for the assistance of Darryl Kramer (B.A., Pennsylvania; J.D., Columbia).
1 The language of § 16(b) is as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
tionship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such secu-
rity was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail
or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to
prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two
years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time
of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 781 (b) (1970). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is hereinafter referred to
as the "Exchange Act."
2 Each reference herein to a purchase followed by a sale shall be deemed to include a sale
followed by a purchase.
3 Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act requires an issuer, with assets exceeding $1,000,000
and a class of equity security not listed on a national securities exchange but held of record
by at least 500 persons, to register such security under the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970). This subjects the issuer to the proxy rules, see SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-1 to 240.14a-103 (1973), and the periodic reporting requirements of § 13, 15 U.S.C.§ 78m (1970), as well as subjecting its insiders to § 16.
Section 16(b) refers to "such beneficial owner, directors or officer." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970) (emphasis supplied). This requires reference to the language of § 16(a) in order
to determine the categories of persons to which § 16(b) applies. Section 16(a) speaks of any
"person who is . . . the beneficial owner of more than 10[%] of any class of any equity
security ... which is registered pursuant to section 12 . .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). The
full text of § 16(a) and a description of the reports which must be filed thereunder appear at
note 181.1 infra. In the case of an officer or a director, if the issuer has but one class of equity
security registered, § 16(b) applies also to their transactions in its unregistered classes. 2 L.
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When originally enacted, the statute was intended to squeeze out any profits
derived by insiders from short-swing trading in the equity securities of their own
companies without requiring proof of abuse of inside information or the motive
of the insider in purchasing or selling the securities.4 With respect to conventional
cash transactions, Section 16(b) has presented relatively few problems which
have not been resolved either by the courts5 or, in certain technical areas, by
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1038-39 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. However, a
more-than-10% owner of unregistered equity securities who is neither an officer nor a director is
not subject to § 16(b) with respect to his transactions in registered securities. 5 Loss 3002
(Supp. 1969).
4 The section has been described as "a crude rule of thumb." Statement of Thomas G.
Corcoran, Esq., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
5 One area in which the application of § 16(b) has produced some uncertainty concerns
the attribution of director or officer status to an entity one of whose members is a director or
officer of the issuer. The first case to even hint at such a possibility was Rattner v. Lehman,
193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952), where Judge Learned Hand recognized the possibility of
liability on the part of a firm which had "deputed a partner to represent its interests as a
director on the [issuer's] board . I..." Id  at 567.
The Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), gave viability to the
deputization theory, although the Court found it inapplicable to the case under consideration.
The Court acknowledged that the provisions of the Exchange Act permit a partnership to be
deemed a director for § 16(b) purposes. However, the language used was somewhat more
limited than that used by Judge Hand, i.e., liability would be imposed upon the partner-
ship if it "actually functioned as a director through .. .[the partner], who had been deputized
by... [the partnership] to perform a director's duties not for himself but for . .. [the partner-
ship]." 1-d. at 410.
The evidence in Lehman indicated that Thomas, a partner in Lehman Brothers, had
succeeded Hertz, also a partner in Lehman, as a director of the issuer, Tide Water. Hertzjoined Tide Water thinking it to be in the interests of Lehman Brothers. For the same reason,
Hertz suggested Thomas as his successor. Thomas had never discussed the operating details
of Tide Water with any other partner of Lehman Brothers. Lehman's purchasing of Tide Water
shares was predicated solely upon public announcements made by the issuer. Thomas was
unaware of Lehman's intent to purchase shares of Tide Water until after the transactions had
been consummated. Under these facts, the Court found that Thomas was not a deputy of
Lehman Brothers.
The signal case in the evolution of the deputization doctrine was Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970), where the Second
Circuit reversed the district court and found that George M. Bunker, President and Chief
Executive of Martin Marietta, had been deputized by Martin Marietta to serve as a director
of the Sperry Rand Corp. The Second Circuit indicated five evidentiary factors which led to
its finding that the determination by the district court was "clearly erroneous." First, Bunker
testified that he was ultimately responsible for the total operation of Martin Marietta, including
personal approval of all purchases of Sperry shares. Secondly, Bunker had been furnished with
information concerning Sperry's financial outlook and had discussed Sperry's affairs with
officials at Martin Marietta pursuant to a review of the latter's investment in the former.
Thirdly, Bunker's letter of resignation stated that his presence on the Board of Directors of
Martin Marietta was due to the belief of Sperry officials "that the Martin Marietta ownership
of a substantial number of shares of Sperry Rand should have representation on . . . [the
Sperry] Board." 406 F.2d at 265. In addition, Bunker was given approval by the Martin
Marietta Board of Directors to become a Sperry director at the time that the Martin Marietta
Board was informed of its ten million dollar investment in Sperry. The court noted the
inescapable inference to be drawn therefrom. Finally, the court noted that Martin Marietta
had similar representatives on the boards of other corporations, albeit Bunker's position in
the Martin Marietta hierarchy was atypical.
Hopefully, Feder can be distinguished from most other seemingly analogous situations
because Bunker exercised a significant degree of control over the deputizing entity. The court
itself noted the difference between Bunker's position vis-a-vis Martin Marietta and that of
Thomas in Blau v. Lehman. Id. at 264-65. However, later in the opinion, the court dismissed
the distinction between Bunker and other Martin Marietta representatives sitting on the boards
of other companies, stating that Bunker's controlling position was of no import. Id. at 265.
The utilization of this policy of Martin Marietta, i.e., the staffing of corporate boards with
its representatives, as a factor in finding Bunker to be a deputy, is a bit circular. It also
points up the "real world" problems posed by the Second Circuit's rationale. One significant
question which remains unanswered is the possible liability arising from the designation to the
issuer's board of an individual who is not in a controlling position with respect to the defendant.
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existing SEC exemptive rules.6 However, the apparent simplicity of the statutory
scheme has yielded to significant interpretative problems when applied to a
variety of complex transactional areas probably not anticipated in 1934, includ-
ing the modem forms of corporate reclassifications and reorganizations, stock
option and employee stock purchase plans. In confronting these problems, the
courts have developed an expanding body of law by which they have attempted
to satisfy the statutory purpose while avoiding harsh and uneven results. This
has culminated in the recent significant Supreme Court decision in Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,' which indicates that the jurisprudence
of Section 16(b) has reached an interesting, albeit somewhat troubling, maturity.
In conventional cash purchases and sales of securities, the courts have im-
plemented the statutory objective through a literal, automatic approach to the
imposition of liability.' In scrutinizing non-cash transactions, the matter is one of
definition, i.e., whether a "purchase" or "sale" has occurred for Section 16(b)
purposes which would trigger liability for short-swing profits.' However, the
definitions of "purchase7''" and "sale! 1 in the Exchange Act furnish little assist-
ance in identifying which non-cash transactions reflect the "unfair use of [inside]
In light of the broad language of Feder and the practical considerations involved, the
proper approach may call for the express elimination of the deputization doctrine from the
interpretations of § 16(b). See ALI FED. Sac. CODE § 226 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). The
only other viable alternative would seem to be to require proof of a more stringent nature
than that required by the Second Circuit in Feder, e.g., proof that the deputy was actually a
mere puppet who exercised no independent control over his actions on the issuer's board of
directors, or, in the case of an insider who effectively controls the defendant, proof that the
insider's decisions vis-a-vis the issuer were not in the best interests of the issuer but, rather,
were in the interests of the defendant.
The recent case of Popkin v. Dingman, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP'.
94,203, at 94,864 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), represents an interestinq variation of the deputization
problem. Two directors, minority shareholders of the Allied Equities Corp., also served as direc-
tors of Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc. Allied owned a large block of Wheelabrator shares. Within a
period of six months, the directors had purchased Wheelabrator common shares and Allied
had sold Wheelabrator common shares, the directors abstaining from the vote authorizing the
sale. The plaintiffs attempted to match the pro rata portion of the Wheelabrator shares sold
by Allied against the directors' purchases. This differed from the situation in Feder, where both
the purchase and sale transactions were effected by the deputizing entity. The court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument, finding that the sale by Allied could not be attributed to the directors
since the directors could neither control nor prevent the sale. Id. at 94,866. The court went
on to distinguish the situation at bar from those where the realization of a profit by an
organization from a particular transaction may be attributed to a partner or a controlling
person. Id. at 94,867-69. The court emphasized the "very basic differences in the nature of
corporate and partnership forms. ... " Id. at 94,867. While "[profit sharing is the essence
of partnership ... [a] shareholder's profit interest from a particular corporate transaction is
merely a hope, and clearly not more than a speculative estimate." Id.; cf. Marquette Cement
Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
6 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-8 (1973) (transactions involving the deposit or with-
drawal of equity securities under a voting trust or deposit agreement); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6
(1973) (sales within six months of the exercise of an option). For a detailed analysis of Rule
16b-6 see note 148 infra.
7 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
8 See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943).
9 See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-95
(1973), Gold v. Sloan, 11973 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEc. L. REP. 94,186, at 94,793 (4th
Cir. 1973); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970).
10 "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1970).
11 "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
Id. at § 78c(a) (14) (1970).
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information" which the statute seeks to prevent." Thus, the courts have re-
flected considerable doubt upon the wisdom of applying Section 16 (b) in a rigid
or automatic fashion and have increasingly resorted to a flexible or pragmatic
approach for the purpose of determining whether liability should ensue where
the transaction under scrutiny consists of a non-cash realignment or potential
alteration of an insider's equity interest in the issuer. In applying this ap-
proach, before determining whether a "purchase" or "sale" has occurred for
statutory purposes, the court will, in most cases, inquire into the question of
whether the transactions under scrutiny and the statutory insider's relationship
thereto present such a possible or potential opportunity for speculative abuse, as
distinguished from its actual demonstration, as the statute is designed to curb."
In effect, this limited inquiry furnishes the means of rebutting the statutory pre-
sumption of unfair use of inside information whenever one or both of the trans-
actions effected by a statutory insider within a six-month period is not a- con-
ventional cash purchase or sale.'4
The first cases to reflect the adoption of the speculative abuse approach to
the statute involved transactions in convertible securities. In Ferraiolo u. New-
man, 5 the Sixth Circuit held in 1958 that the conversion of preferred shares into
common shares of the same issuer did not constitute a "purchase" for Section
16(b) purposes and could not, therefore, be matched with a subsequent sale of
the underlying common shares." The court noted that the insider had no con-
trol with respect to the issuer's decision to call the preferred shares for redemption
which, in turn, led to a "forced" conversion.' In addition, the convertible pre-
ferred shares and the underlying common shares were deemed by the court to
be "economic equivalents" in terms of the market values ascribed to both
classes of such securities, thereby pointing to the fact that the insider had not
altered his investment position."
The rationale of Ferraiola was quite different from the automatic approach
adopted earlier by the Second Circuit in Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 9 where
the court stressed the all-inclusive definition of "purchase" in the Exchange Act.
The Ferraiolo decision also differed from the approach subsequently taken by the
Third Circuit in 1965 in Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,2° where the court followed
12 The preamble of § 16(b) states that the statute was designed "[flor the purpose of
preventing the unfair use of [inside] information ... ." Id. at § 78p(b) '(1970).
13 See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595
(1973); Gold v. Sloan, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FEr. S~c. L. REP. 1 94,186, at 94,793
(4th Cir. 1973); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 854 (1970); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1157-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
14 See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
15 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
16 259 F.2d at 345-46.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 '(1947). The court held that the
defendant's conversion of preferred shares constituted a "purchase" of the underlying common
shares to be matched with a cash sale of the common shares within six months of the conversion.
The conversion was deemed to fit literally within the Exchange Act's definition of the- term
"purchase," i.e., a "contract . . . to acquire." 160 F.2d at 987.
20 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). The court, applying the automatic approach, determined
that the conversion of convertible debentures into common shares constituted a "purchase"
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Park & Tilford in finding liability, but held, upon the urging of the SEC,2 that
no profit had been realized on the conversion constituting the "sale."
The most comprehensive statement of the speculative abuse test was articu-
lated in 1966 by the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb2" which, although arising in
the area of convertible securities, has become a central precedent in other in-
terpretative areas of Section 16(b) as well. In that case, the court held that the
conversion of preferred shares into common shares, which occurred within six
months of the "purchase" of the preferred shares, did not constitute a "sale" for
purposes of the statute.2" Judge Waterman rejected an automatic construction
of Section 16(b), preferring to determine whether the transaction in question
could possibly lend itself to speculative abuse.2" Having adopted this mode of
analysis, the court found that there could be no such speculative abuse where the
convertible preferred shares and the common shares were "economic equiva-
lents."2 However, Judge Waterman limited the concept of economic equiva-
lence to the facts of the case-i.e., where the convertible security had an ascer-
tainable market value which was at least equal to that of the underlying security.
The decision was careful to note that such concept was inapplicable to the issuance
of securities by one issuer in exchange for those of a second issuer.26 Significantly,
the Lamb case involved a cause of action arising prior to the promulgation by the
SEC of Rule 16b-9, which provides that the acquisition or disposition of equity
securities upon conversion of one class into another class of such securities of the
same issuer is generally exempt from the operation of Section 16(b). The
exemption provided by the rule is unavailable if there has been a combination
of a "purchase" of the convertible security and a "sale" of the underlying security,
or a "sale" of the convertible security and a "purchase" of the underlying secu-
rity, within any six-month period including the date of conversion.2"
of the common shares to be matched with the subsequent sale of the common shares. The
same act of converting the debentures into common shares was held to constitute a "sale" of
the debentures which could be matched with their prior purchase.
21 The Commission also submitted an amicus brief in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d
342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 '(1959). Exchange Act § 3(b) provides that
the SEC has the "power by rules and regulations to define technical, trade and accounting
terms .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1970). Similarly, the Commission is specifically empowered
to promulgate rules and regulations under § 16(b) in order to exempt any transaction "as not
comprehended within the purpose of... [the] subsection." Id. § 78p(b). With respect to rules
promulgated by the Commission, the staff has issued interpretative letters. See, e.g., note 158
infra. However, as it has no enforcement powers under § 16(b), the Commission has consistently
refused to render any interpretations concerning that provision. See, e.g., Robert S. Persky, 1971
WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available July 23, 1971); see also SEC Rule 12h-3 (exemption from
the operation of § 16(b) for transactions occurring prior to registration under § 12(g)). 17
C.F.R. § 240.12h-3 (1973).
22 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
23 363 F.2d at 522.
24 Id. at 517-19.
25 Id. at 521-23.
26 Id. at 523-25.
27 Rule 16b-9 provides as follows:
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the con-
version of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms of the
corporate charter or other governing instruments, is convertible immediately or after
a stated period of time into another equity security of the same issuer, shall be exempt
from the operation of Section 16(b) of the Act; Provided, however, That this rule
shall not apply to the extent that there shall have been either (1) a purchase of any
equity security of the class convertible (including any acquisition of or change in a
conversion privilege) and a sale of any equity security of the class issuable upon
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Although Rule 16b-9 has largely removed uncertainties in transactions in-
volving convertible securities, the development of the law with respect to other
categories of extraordinary, non-cash transactions leaves certain important ques-
tions unanswered. Two such areas which are of considerable importance in
today's corporate and financial world are (1) corporate reorganizations and (2)
transactions in stock options issued pursuant to either stock option or employee
stock purchase plans or granted or acquired in transactions frequently related
to corporate reorganizations. This article focuses on a review of the factors which
have been determinative in recent interpretations of Section 16(b) in these two
areas. It seeks to examine whether the cases reveal any consistent body of law
which may be relied upon by the bar in assessing the potential liability under
Section 16(b) arising from a particular factual setting or series of transactions.
An inquiry into these unresolved problems leads, in turn, to the question of
whether judicially developed criteria for interpreting so highly technical a
statute are adequate from the standpoint of predictability and fulfillment of
statutory purpose.
II. Corporate Reorganizations and Speculative Abuse
Corporate reorganizations include mergers, consolidations,28 exchanges of
securities by the shareholders of the acquired corporation for those of the acquir-
ing corporation," or exchanges of assets of the acquired corporation for securities
of the acquiring corporation." Reorganization transactions may also result from
tender offers for cash or securities if the management of the target company is
hostile to the tender offeror and arranges a "defensive merger" with another
corporation."1 Accordingly, corporate reorganizations may either reflect the
mutual desire of the parties to combine the assets and operations of different
conversion, or (2) a sale of any equity security of the class convertible and any pur-
chase of any equity security issuable upon conversion '(otherwise than in a trans-
action involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted by any other rule
under Section 16(b)) within a period of less than 6 months which includes the date
of conversion.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an equity security shall not be deemed
to be acquired or disposed of upon conversion of an equity security if the terms of
the equity security converted require the payment or entail the receipt, in connection
with such conversion, of cash or other property (other than equity securities involved
in the conversion) equal in value at the time of conversion to more than 15 percent
of the value of the equity security issued upon conversion.
(c) For the purpose of this section, an equity security shall be deemed con-
vertible if it is convertible at the option of the holder or of some other person or
by operation of the terms of the security or the governing instruments.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1973).
28 A statutory merger and a consolidation are commonly referred to as "Type A" reorgan-
izations. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (A).
29 Where the acquiring corporation exchanges only its voting shares for the shares of the
acquired corporation, the transaction is commonly referred to as a "Type B" reorganization.
Id. § 368(a) (1) (B).
30 Where the acquiring corporation exchanges only its voting shares for substantially all
of the properties of the acquired corporation, the transaction is commonly referred to as a
"Type C" reorganization. Id. § 368(a) (1) (C).
31 "A tender offer is a public invitation to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their
shares for sale at a specified price." The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. RBv. 1, 292
n.14 (1973). For examples of defensive mergers see text accompanying notes 33, 34, 51, & 52
infra.
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entities or may represent the final episode in a contested bid for corporate
control. While it is dear that an exchange of securities of one corporation for
those of another corporation does not, in and of itself, 82 constitute a matchable
"purchase" and "sale" of securities which would invoke liability under Section
16(b), nevertheless these exchanges of securities, when matched with other
transactions in the same class of securities of either issuer prior or subsequent to
the reorganization, raise difficult questions of potential liability under the statute.
The signal event in the history of the interpretation of Section 16(b) in the
context of corporate reorganizations is the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp,' which arose out of a
cash tender offer by Occidental in 1967 to purchase shares of Kern County Land
Company. Pursuant to this offer, Occidental ultimately acquired approximately
22% of the outstanding shares of Kern and had become a more-than-10o%
shareholder of Kern by May 1967. Kern's management, which had previously
rejected Occidental's proposals for a merger, reacted to the tender offer by
arranging for the sale of Kern's assets to a newly formed subsidiary of Tenneco,
Inc. in exchange for a new class of preferred shares of Tenneco. Confronted
with this prospect of a defensive merger, Occidental and Tenneco entered into
an agreement in early June 1967 whereby Occidental granted Tenneco an option
to purchase at a fixed price all of the Tenneco preferred shares to be issued to
Occidental, as a shareholder of Kern, pursuant to the reorganization. This op-
tion was conditioned upon consummation of the Kern-Tenneco reorganization
and was exercisable upon the expiration of six months following the date of its
grant. Occidental subsequently abstained from voting its Kern shares with
respect to, and also indicated its non-opposition to, the proposed reorganization
with Tenneco. After some abortive attempts by Occidental to delay its consum-
mation, the Kern-Tenneco reorganization was completed in late August 1967,
less than six months after the date upon which Occidental, through its cash
tender offer purchases, had become a statutory insider. The option granted by
Occidental to Tenneco was exercised by a designee of Tenneco in December
1967, slightly more than six months after the date of grant. The plaintiff con-
tended that the transfer of Kern shares upon the Kern-Tenneco reorganization
and the grant by Occidental of the option to purchase Tenneco shares both con-
stituted "sales" within the meaning of Section 16(b) which could be matched
with Occidental's purchase of the Kern shares within six months prior thereto.
The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and granted
summary judgment in favor of Occidental."' The court held that Occidental was
not liable for any "profits" it derived upon the exchange of Kern shares for the
Tenneco preferred shares incident to the reorganizations and that the Occi-
dental-Tenneco option did not constitute a "sale" for purposes of Section 16(b) .3
Applying the speculative abuse test, Judge Friendly stressed the fact that, by
32 Cf. Heli-Coil v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), discussed at note 20 supra.
33 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
34 Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
35 450 F.2d at 165.
36 Id.
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reason of the antagonistic posture of Kern's management, Occidental did not
have access to inside information and did not control the timing or terms of the
Kern-Tenneco reorganization."' The Supreme Court, affirming the Second
Circuit, squarely held-that, despite the fact that Occidental was a statutory in-
sider, its inability to control Kern or the course of the Kern-Tenneco defensive
merger and the related failure to demonstrate that Occidental had access to
inside information required a finding of no liability under Section 16(b).11
The Kern case represents the first occasion upon which the Supreme Court
addressed itself directly to the question of Section 16(b) liability arising out of
a non-cash securities transaction incident to a corporate reorganization. In Kern
the Court put its imprimatur on the validity of the speculative abuse test by
noting that the crucial question in extraordinary transactions is whether
the transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought
to prevent-the realization of short-swing profits based upon access to inside
information-thereby endeavoring to implement congressional objectives
without extending the reach of the statute beyond its intended limits s9
In sanctioning the use of the speculative abuse test to determine whether the
acquisition or disposition of securities incident to a corporate reorganization will
be deemed a "purchase" or "sale" for Section 16(b) purposes, Kern did not
stress the broad definitions of those terms under the Exchange Act. Rather, the
Kern analysis of the terms "purchase" and "sale" was undertaken with reference
to whether the circumstances of the transactions under review mandated the
imposition of liability in light of statutory purpose.4" The Court acknowl-
edged the statutory presumption that Occidental, by virtue of its position as an
insider, possessed the potential for speculative abuse which the statute was
designed to curb, but regarded as determinative the realities of Occidental's posi-
tion vis-a-vis the hostile management of Kern.4' It found that the possibility that
Occidental could gain access to inside information was quite remote since Oc-
cidental's efforts were opposed by the management of Kern throughout the
relevant period. 2 With respect to the issue of control, the Court noted that the
Kern-Tenneco merger was "not engineered by Occidental"" and that Occidental
neither participated in, nor controlled, the negotiations. It thus appears that
the Kern opinion focused on two variables in order to determine whether the
statutory presumption should be rebutted: (1) access to inside information and
(2) the insider's control relationship to the issuer with respect to transactions
under scrutiny.
37 Id. at 163.
38 411 U.S. at 598-600. The analysis of the application of § 16(b) with respect to option
transactions begins at text accompanying note 113 infra.
39 411 U.S. at 594-95.
40 Id. at 593-95.
41 Id. at 598-600.
42 Id. at 598.
43 Id. at 599.
44 Id.
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A. The Control Variable
The Supreme Court's Kern opinion seems to indicate that "control" is
relevant under Section 16(b) only if an insider has the power to engage in un-
fair short-term trading by reason of his relationship to the issuer and to the series
of transactions under review. 5 The Court's concept of control thus appears to
be more limited and to serve a more special purpose than the broad concepts of
control appearing throughout the various federal securities statutes. 6 While the
Supreme Court determined that the facts of Kern pointed to the conclusion that
Occidental controlled neither Kern nor the course of the Kern-Tenneco defensive
merger, there have been reorganization transactions where the test enunciated
by the Kern Court would probably have resulted in liability. In this respect, the
Second Circuit's 1970 decision in Newmark v. RKO General, IncY7 is instructive.
Newmark arose out of a merger in 1967 between Frontier Airlines, theretofore
controlled by RKO, and Central Airlines. In the course of negotiating the
merger, RKO obtained an option to purchase securities representing approxi-
mately 49% of the outstanding shares of Central at a fixed price upon the ful-
fillment of certain conditions precedent to the merger. RKO and the Central
shareholders agreed to vote their respective controlling interests in favor of the
merger.48 However, RKO had no fixed obligation to consummate the purchase,
as it retained the express privilege to abandon both the merger and purchase
agreements if, in its own "good faith judgment," the Civil Aeronautics Board sub-
sidy was inadequate.4 The terms of these transactions were agreed upon prior to
public announcement of the impending merger, which predictably resulted in an
appreciation in the market price. Upon satisfaction of the conditions, RKO
exercised its option to purchase the controlling block of the Central securities,
and the Frontier-Central merger was consummated shortly thereafter. The
Second Circuit, impressed with the control which RKO possessed and the un-
fair trading advantage which it had secured as a result of such control, found the
presence of a potential for speculative abuse and characterized RKO's position
as "[h]eads I win, tails I do not lose.""0
45 Id. at 599-600.
46 The definition of "control" as promulgated by the SEC under Rule 405 of the Securities
Act of 1933 is as follows:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled by" and "under
common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through
the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1973). See also Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(9), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (9) (1970) ( '[clontrol' means the power to exercise a controlling influence
over the management or policies of a company, unless such power is solely the result of an official
position with such company").
47 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
48 The purchase contract required the sellers, the owners of 66% of Central's voting
shares, to cause Central to take all necessary corporate action to authorize and approve the
merger with Frontier; similarly, RKO. the owner of 56% of Frontier's voting shares, was
required to cause Frontier to take all necessary corporate action to authorize and approve the
merger with Central. 425 F.2d at 351-52 n.3.
49 Id. at 353.
50 Id. at 354. In Newmark, the basic award of damages was the difference between the
price which RKO paid for its Central securities and the market value, on the date of the
merger, of the Frontier securities which RKO received in return for its holdings in Central.
Id. at 357. For a discussion of the "control premium" see infra. The Central securities were
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With respect to the question of control, Newmark is distinguishable from,
and thus remains an important precedent even after, the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Kern, in which the element of control of the issuer and the reorganization
process were also central considerations. In Newmark, which involved a non-
contested transaction, the presence of that control or power was demonstrated and
the statutory presumption could not be rebutted. In contrast, Kern, which in-
volved a contested bid for control during the crucial statutory period, held that
such power was lacking.
deemed to include not only the Central common shares which RKO actually held, but the
Central common shares into which the Central debentures were convertible. The computation
of damages, therefore, included the difference between the cost to RKO of the debentures and
the value of the Frontier shares for which approximately 150,000 Central shares (the number
of shares into which the debentures were convertible) were exchangeable pursuant to the mer-
ger. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to RKO's purpose in purchasing the deben-
tures and the manner in which the parties themselves characterized these securities in the
merger agreement. The court decided that RKO purchased the debentures because of their
convertibility into Central common. Accordingly, the cost of the debentures was based not upon
the face value of the debentures, but rather upon the number of Central shares into which
they could be converted and the purchase price of each such share. Id.
In Kramer v. Ayer, 317 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court-was faced with the
problem of calculating the defendant's cost. The profit realized upon the proscribed sales was
held to be the difference between the net receipts derived from such sales less the cost of the
shares sold. Id. at 257. The cost was equal to the value of that which was given up in order
to obtain that which was sold. Id. at 257-58. The court indicated a marked preference toward
using the lowest market price on the appropriate date, where available, rather than the bid
and asked quotations, particularly since the shares were actively traded. Id. at 258-60. Thejustification for using the lowest market price was the rationale of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), which provides that the recoverable
profit under § 16(b) shall be the difference between the highest sales price and the lowest
purchase price.
In Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972),
the basic premise was the same-from the amount received by the defendant was subtracted
the cost of the Gypsum shares which he had sold. Id. at 86. The cost was the market value
so far as it could be ascertained as of the appropriate date. Id. at 86-88. On the appropriate
date, however, there was no actual trading in Gypsum shares. The court, therefore, utilized
the bid and asked quotations to ascertain the market value. Id. at 87. It refused to use the
low bid price and stated that Smolowe is merely a guide to be used when two reasonable alter-
natives are present. "[Smolowe] does not require a court to adopt a completely unrealistic
interpretation of the market." Id; see Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & West. Indus., Inc.,
CCH CURRENT F-D. SEC. L. REP. I 94,421, at 95,430 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1974).
The courts have begun to take into account in the computation of § 16(b) damages
the concept of a "control premium." Thus in Newmark, the court found that the block of
Frontier shares which were exchanged for the block of Central shares had a special value to
RKO since RKO could not have retained legal control of Frontier following the merger
without it. It thereupon increased the value of the Frontier shares which RKO had "sold"
by 15%. 425 F.2d at 357-58. The actual percentage was based upon past sales of large
blocks of Frontier shares.
In Korholz, the "premium" doctrine was utilized to reduce the § 16(b) damages. As
consideration for the shares purchased, Korholz parted with a controlling block of Gypsum
shares. By means of expert testimony at trial, the premium was valued at 20%. 449 F.2d at
88. Thus, the cost of that with which Korholz had parted was increased, resulting in a deter-
mination that he realized no profit under § 16(b).
A number of courts have also dealt with the question of dividends as part of the recover-
able profit under § 16(b). In Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959), cash dividends
were declared after defendant had become a director and during the period between the pro-
scribed purchase and sale. The court found that the "shares on which the ... dividends were
declared and paid ... were sold ... at a loss . .. which was greater than the amount of the
dividends." Id. at 849. Thus, no profits were realized by the insider.
In Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), a case involving cash dividends received by an insider be-
tween the date of his acquisition of the issuer's securities and his subsequent disposition thereof,
the dividends were included in the profit realized which was recoverable by the issuer. The
court distinguished the situation at bar from that discussed in Klawans, noting that the defen-
dant in Gamble.Skogmo was an insider at the time of the declaration and payment of the
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The Kern opinion also dealt with the question of the scope of the concept
of control from the standpoint of speculative abuse under the statute. This ques-
tion had been somewhat obfuscated by a 1971 district court decision in American
Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,5 which was decided subsequent to the Second
Circuit's decision in Newmark and the district court's decision holding Occidental
liable in the Kern case. Crane involved a cash tender offer by Crane for shares of
Westinghouse Air Brake in June 1967. After a proposal for a Crane-Air Brake
merger was rejected by the management of Air Brake, Crane resumed the pur-
chase of additional Air Brake shares, thereby becoming a statutory insider in early
1968. This provoked an agreement for a defensive merger by Air Brake with
American Standard. After public disclosure of the proposed merger, the man-
agement of Crane, recognizing the problems inherent in its becoming a minority
shareholder of American Standard, undertook a further tender offer for addi-
tional Air Brake shares pursuant to which it ultimately became the holder of ap
-
proximately 32% of the outstanding shares of Air Brake. In the course of the
dividend. See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
where cash dividends, declared and issued after the defendant had become an insider and
during the interval between purchase and sale, were viewed as additional profit realized.
"The 'possibility' of insider manipulation of the dividend, noticeably absent in the Adler case,
is surely present here." Id. at 968.
In Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rez'd on
other grounds, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971). aff'd sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), the court held that the recoverable profit in-
cluded (1) the third quarter dividend on the Kern shares which was paid on September 2.1,
1968 and (2) the initial quarterly dividend on the Tenneco preference shares which was paid on
January 9, 1968:
Both dividends ... were expressly contracted for in the June 2 option agree-
ment .... The dividend on the . . .Kern stock is clearly recoverable under the
views expressed in [Klawans] and its progeny. [Citing Marquette Cement & Gamble-
Skogmo.]
... The dividend on the Tenneco Preference Stock was provided for in Tenneco's
Certificate of Incorporation and not subject to the kind of insider manipulation cited
in Adler .... However, where such a dividend is expressly contracted for regardless
of the record ownership of the stock ... other opportunities for abuse are present.
323 F. Supp. at 582-83. One opportunity for speculative abuse arises "where parties contract
for a low sales price (resulting in a small capital gain) with the retention of future dividends
by the seller." Id., at 583.
In Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc. [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] COCH Fa. Sac. L. RaP.1 90,612 (S.D.N.Y.), reu'd on other grounds, 208 F.2d 600 "(2d Cir. 1953), an insider had
made a sale followed by a purchase of the issuer's securities. Dividends were declared and
paid by the issuer during the interval. The court deducted these dividends from the "gross"
profit realized.
But see Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), where, in the context of a non-cash transaction, a
cash dividend was deemed "too incidental and not 'so inextricably connected' with defendant's
purchase-and-sale transactions as to be included in the amount recoverable." 242 F. Supp.
at 161. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the issuer's history of paying quarterly
cash dividends for a period of at least one year prior to the dividend in question. Interestingly,
the Second Circuit differed with the district court and required a proportionate adjustment in
the price per share for the purpose of computing the recoverable profit where a sale of securities,
occurring prior to a 100% stock dividend, was matched with a subsequent purchase of securi-
ties occurring after such stock dividend. 363 F.2d at 527. For an analysis of the question
of damages in the context of corporate reorganizations see Lang & Katz, Liability for "Short
Swing" Trading in Corporate Reorganizations, 20 Sw. L.J. 472 (1966).
The Proposed Federal Securities Code of the American Law Institute provides that lia-
bility under § 1413, the analogue of § 16(b), is to be reduced by the costs, interest and
damages '(not including attorneys' fees) incurred by the defendant in connection with suits
arising under other "insider trading" liability provisions. ALI Fa. Sac. CoDa § 1413(i)
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). This section of the Code is discussed in more detail at note 191
infra.
51 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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battle for corporate control, American Standard engaged in certain purchases and
sales of Westinghouse shares subsequently found by the Second Circuit to con-
stitute violations of the anti-manipulative provisions of Sections 9 and 10(b) of
the Exchange Act.2 In June 1968, soon after consummation of the defensive
merger between Air Brake and American Standard, Crane sold, at a considerable
profit, substantially all of the American Standard shares issued to it upon the
merger. These sales occurred within six months of the date upon which Crane
had become the holder of more than 10% of Air Brake's shares.
The district court held that, notwithstanding Crane's allegations that it was
a "forced seller," Crane's exchange of Air Brake shares pursuant to the de-
fensive merger constituted a "sale" for Section 16(b) purposes to be matched
with its prior purchases of Air Brake shares within the statutory period." In
support of its conclusion, the district court found that "opportunities for specula-
tive abuse did inhere in Crane's transactions"5 4 since Crane, aware of the pos-
sibility of reaping a substantial profit arising from the dynamics of the contest for
corporate control, continued to purchase Air Brake shares even after the rejection
of its original merger proposal.5 The court analogized Crane's position to that
of RKO in Newmark." It also advanced the related proposition that since Crane
was in a position to influence the course and terms of the Air Brake-American
Standard merger in "significant ways" by establishing the terms of its own tender
offer, it was liable under Section 16(b).57
Crane articulated a concept of control which could be ascribed to a statutory
insider although that insider did not occupy the type of relationship with the
issuer which would permit it to be a significant moving force in the transactions
under scrutiny -indeed, where the insider was confronted by the hostile manage-
ment of the issuer. The Supreme Court in Kern seems to have undercut Crane's
concept of control by holding that the potential for the realization of a substantial
profit by Occidental, whose antagonistic relationship to the management of the
target company paralleled that of Crane, was irrelevant to the question of specu-
lative abuse in the absence of access to inside information. Without citing Crane,
the Court stated:
It is also wide of the mark to assert that Occidental, as a sophisticated
corporation knowledgeable in matters of corporate affairs and finance,
knew that its tender offer would either succeed or would be met with a
"defensive merger." If its takeover efforts failed, it is argued, Occidental
knew it could sell its stock to the target company's merger partner at a
substantial profit. Calculations of this sort, however, whether speculative
or not and whether fair or unfair to other stockholders or to Old Kern,
do not represent the kind of speculative abuse at which the statute is aimed,
for they could not have been based on inside information obtained from
52 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
53 346 F. Supp. at 1161.
54 Id. at 1159.
55 Id. at 1161.
56 Id. at 1160-61.
57 Id. at 1161. See the Supplemental Opinion of the district court which was occasioned
by the Second Circuit's holding in the Kern case and which stressed considerations discussed
at the text accompanying notes 83-94 infra. 346 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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substantial stockholdings that did not yet exist. Accepting both that Oc-
cidental made this very prediction and that it would recurringly be an ac-
curate forecast in tender-offer situations, we nevertheless fail to perceive
how the fruition of such anticipated events would require, or in any way
depend upon, the receipt and use of inside information. If there are evils to
be redressed by way of deterring those who would make tender offers, §
16(b) does not appear to us to have been designed for this task.s
Thus, Justice White indicated in Kern that the ability of an insider to derive a
profit from a series of transactions, one of which is extraordinary in nature, is not
a concomitant of the control aspect of the speculative abuse test where access to
inside information is not a factor in yielding that profit.59
Significantly, the Kern Court also delineated the relationship between the
control variable and the concept of access to inside information. As the Court's
analysis indicates, control denotes and, in effect, assumes access to inside infor-
mation, whereas such access can be ascribed to the insider even if he does not
possess a control relationship to the issuer and to the transactions under scrutiny."
That access to inside information can exist independent of the element of con-
trol appears to comport with the language and purposes of the statute.61
58 411 U.S. at 597-98 (emphasis supplied).
59 The Second Circuit appears to have invited Crane to appeal the district court's holding
that Crane effected a "sale" of its Air Brake shares. BNA SEC. REG. & L. Rnp. No. 233, at E-1(2d Cir. 1973). It stated that such appeal would serve to extricate the combatants from the
"Brobdingnagian procedural imbroglio" that has characterized this litigation. Id.
Four days after the Standard-Air Brake merger, an Air Brake shareholder sued Air Brake,
Standard and Crane under § 16(b). The complaint, filed prior to Crane's cash sales of the
shares it received pursuant to the merger, alleged that Crane's demand of an appraisal of its
Air Brake shareholdings, prior to consummation of the merger, constituted a § 16(b) "sale"
of its Air Brake shares.
A second Air Brake shareholder sued shortly thereafter, alleging that Crane had violated§ 16(b) by (1) purchasing Air Brake shares and then exchanging them for Standard shares
pursuant to the reorganization and (2) selling the Standard shares within six months of
receiving them in the merger exchange.
Subsequently, a Standard shareholder sued Crane derivatively, alleging that Crane's sale
of Standard shares within six months of its purchase of Air Brake shares violated § 16(b).
Finally, Standard instituted its own § 16(b) action, alleging that Crane was liable for
the short-swing profits it made on the entire sequence of transactions.
Crane thereupon filed a third-party complaint, an answer in the Standard suit and a
motion to consolidate three of the § 16 (b) actions pending against it. The third-party com-
plaint, brought against the Air Brake directors, alleged that they had conspired to expose
Crane to possible § 16(b) liability. The third-party complaint prayed for judgment against
the Air Brake directors for any § 16(b) liability that Crane might suffer. Crane's answer
to the Standard suit claimed that the merger exchange was neither a "purchase" nor a "sale,"
and that its cash sales of Standard shares, under threat of antitrust action, was not a § 16(b)
"sale."
Judge McLean dismissed the Standard shareholder's suit and directed consolidation of
the three other § 16(b) suits. An amended complaint was served by Standard on behalf of
all three plaintiffs. Crane's answer included a defense and a counterclaim based upon alleged
violations by Standard of §§ 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act. Standard replied that this
counterclaim was barred by a previous judgment, the appeal of which was then pending.
Crane proceeded to file another third-party complaint against the former Air Brake directors
in late 1969, again seeking indemnity for the potential § 16(b) liability. These defendants
answered that this claim was similarly barred. For the ultimate disposition on the question
of liability in the fraud action see Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
In response to motions by both Crane and Standard for summary judgment with respect to
the § 16(b) claim, Judge Lasker issued the Crane opinions analyzed at text accompanying notes
51 to 57 supra and text accompanying note 84 infra.
60 411 U.S. at 598-600.
61 See note 12 supra.
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B. Access to Inside Information
The problems involved in analyzing the question of access to inside informa-
tion in the context of extraordinary, non-cash transactions are illustrated by the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Gold v. Sloan,2 which was rendered shortly after the
Supreme Court's decision in Kern. The Gold case was an outgrowth of the
1967 merger of Atlantic Research Corporation (ARC) into Susquehanna Cor-
poration. Pursuant to the merger, Susquehanna issued newly created preferred
shares for shares of ARC common. As a result of the merger, four ARC insiders
became statutory insiders of Susquehanna. Within six months after the merger,
each of these insiders sold Susquehanna shares in cash transactions. The Fourth
Circuit applied the speculative abuse test to the varying relationships of the
several statutory insider-defendants to ARC and to the ARC-Susquehanna
merger, thereby making a painstaking analysis of whether each of the defendants
could have had access to inside information concerning the surviving company
during the pre-merger period. 6' Based upon such analysis, it held that only
ARC's chief executive officer, who had access to confidential information con-
cerning Susquehanna not then available to other directors or shareholders of
ARC, was liable under Section 16(b) for his post-merger sales of Susquehanna
shares.64
The court's analysis of the relationships of each of the insiders was under-
taken for the purpose of ascertaining whether the statutory presumption could be
rebutted. However, offering an unconvincing comparison to Kern's emphasis
upon the relationships of the parties during the period preceding the Kern-
Tenneco merger, the majority in Gold saw fit to analyze the possibility of specu-
lative abuse solely in terms of the knowledge and relationships of the defendants
prior to their becoming statutory insiders of Susquehanna in order to determine
whether a statutory "purchase" of Susquehanna shares occurred upon the
merger.65 At no point in the majority's opinion was consideration given to the
question of the presumptive access of any of the defendants to inside information
following the date of the ARC-Susquehanna reorganization, despite the fact that
the defendants became statutory insiders of Susquehanna only upon, or shortly
after, its consummation.66 As Judge Winter correctly observed in his dissenting
opinion, by focusing on pre-merger relationships only, the majority in Gold
ignored the post-merger period when the defendants' status as Susquehanna in-
siders invoked the statutory presumption. It was that post-merger period which
the dissent characterized as the proper period for scrutiny under the test."7
It is arguable that the opinions of the Gold majority and dissent are both
incorrect in asserting that only the period preceding or the period following the
62 [1973 Transfer Binder] COH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 94,186, at 94,792 (4th Cir. 1973).
63 Id. at 94,794-801.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 The court in Morales v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 352 F. Supp. 941 '(S.D.N.Y.
1973), was also confronted with a "merger-purchase" question. Similarly, it restricted its
analysis to the possibility of speculative abuse during the pre-merger period. Id. at 944-45.
67 [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,186, at 94,802-07 (4th Cir. 1973)
(dissenting opinion).
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merger should be examined under the test. Indeed, Judge Winter's dissenting
opinion, after stating categorically that the period "following the acquisition"
constitutes the "relevant inquiry,""es proceeds to examine the relationships of the
insiders to ARC and the reorganization process during the period preceding the
merger as well.69 Presumably, if the test is designed to implement the statutory
purpose, an examination of the question of access to inside information and its
potential abuse should not be cut off automatically at the point of time where
the defendant becomes, or ceases to be, a statutory insider of the specific issuer
whose securities are traded.
A reading of Kern and Gold fails to clarify the application of the speculative
abuse test where a non-insider of the acquired corporation becomes an insider of
the acquiring corporation upon the merger and sells shares of the acquiring
corporation, obtained as a result of the merger, within six months thereafter. In
determining whether the reorganization constitutes a Section 16(b) "purchase,"
it seems appropriate to acknowledge the statutory presumption of access to
inside information as a result of insider status during the post-merger period.
The dissent in Gold was faced with the additional problem of an individual
whose status as an insider of the acquiring corporation was achieved subsequent to
the reorganization. Judge Winter determined that "this alone would [not] war-
rant applying § 16 (b) ... because there appears to be no connection, temporal or
factual, between the merger transaction and his becoming an officer.""0 How-
ever, there would appear to be merit in an analogy to the cases where the courts,
while not speaking the language of speculative abuse, have held directors or
officers liable for their short-swing cash sales of securities purchased prior to their
election to such offices. 1 Similarly, the resignation of an officer or director during
this post-merger period should not dissipate the taint of Section 16 (b) where that
insider sells securities obtained upon the merger within six months of the reorgan-
ization but subsequent to his resignation."
There is also some doubt respecting the appropriate result to be reached
where an insider of the acquired corporation becomes an insider of the acquiring
corporation upon the merger, sells shares of the acquiring corporation within six
months of the merger and can rebut the statutory presumption only with respect
to his activities during the posr-merger period. Looking to the pre-merger period
raises the possibility of imposing liability for "purchases" and sales of shares of the
acquiring corporation as a result of the insider's relationship to the acquired
68 Id. at 94,804.
69 Id. at 94,804-07.
70 Id. at 94,806.
71 See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 '(2d Cir. 1959); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.
Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
72 See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970).
Where a non-insider purchases shares of the issuer sufficient to render him a more than
1001 shareholder, that purchase constitutes the point in time at which the six-month holding
period of § 16(b) commences. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). This is so despite the statutory caveat which states
that § 16(b) "shall not be construed to cover any transaction where [the more than 10%
shareholder] was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and pur-
chase... See generally Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972),
discussed at text accompanying notes 95 to 106 infra.
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corporation. Although the dissenting opinion in Gold appears to conclude that
Section 16(b) has not been violated in such a case," that approach may create
temporal distinctions which are as artificial as those set forth in the majority
opinion. Kern is of little aid in this respect, since the Court dealt with a potential
"sale," leaving unanswered the question of the effect to be given the pre-merger
period when the inquiry concerns a potential "purchase."
C. Other Applicable Criteria for Speculative Abuse
It would appear from the preceding discussion of Kern, and its significance
in light of the other reorganization cases applying the speculative abuse test, that
the test, as thus far enunciated by the courts, entails an examination of the two
interrelated variables of access to inside information and ability to control the
decision to effect a reorganization or its terms and timing. Under the current
state of the law, Section 16(b) liability may be imposed even if an insider can
demonstrate either that there has been equality of treatment upon the reorganiza-
tion, in the sense that the insider has retained the same equity interest propor-
tionate to that of the other holders of the same class of securities of the issuer, or
that he has not effected a realization by converting his investment to cash or non-
equity securities which are cash equivalents. Even where these factors are present,
the precedents indicate that an insider will be held liable under Section 16(b) if
he is unable to rebut the statutory presumption that he has, by reason of his status
as an insider, either access to inside information or an ability to control or
materially influence the course of the reorganization. 4
However, not all of the courts have completely ignored an inquiry into the
consequences of the non-cash transaction in order to determine the existence of
the potential for speculative abuse. Several decisions, both within and without
the corporate reorganization context, reflect the concern for the effects of the
extraordinary transaction from the standpoint of whether the insider has derived
any advantages not shared by other holders of the same class of securities of the
issuer. In Roberts v. Eaton," which preceded the articulation of the speculative
abuse test in Lamb and which involved a reclassification of the securities of an
issuer after its approval by shareholders, the Second Circuit held that the issuance
of securities pursuant to the reclassification did not constitute a "purchase"
within the meaning of Section 16(b) to be matched with the private sale of such
73 Although this particular factual setting was not presented in Gold, an examination of
the analysis with respect to the defendant, Scurlock, would seem apposite. The majority,
reversing the district court, found that Scurlock did not possess the potential for speculative
abuse during the pre-merger period. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. IT 94,186,
at 94,799 (4th Cir. 1973). The dissent determined that Scurlock was unable to rebut the
statutory presumption during the post-merger period and, therefore, argued for affirmance.
Id. at 94,805.
74 Equality of treatment of all shareholders upon the reorganization did not preclude a
finding that Sloan, occupying a position of control in ARC before, and in Susquehanna after,
the merger, was liable under § 16(b). Gold v. Sloan, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. R P. If 94,186, at 94,794-99 (4th Cir. 1973); cf. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d
348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970). Liability was imposed in Gold, Newmark and
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), despite the lack
of economic realization.
75 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
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securities one month later.76 Emphasizing the like treatment of all shareholders
and the retention by insiders of the same proportionate equity interests in the
issuer, the court specifically found that the reclassification could not possibly lend
itself to the type of speculative abuse which Section 16(b) was designed to pre-
vent."' Furthermore, Newmark" and, to some extent, Gold" appear to recognize
the need to weigh the consequences of the extraordinary transaction from the
standpoint of the relative treatment of all shareholders. The decision in Newmark
reflects a concern for the special benefit which RKO, as a controlling shareholder
of Frontier, derived from its option to purchase the controlling block of Central
shares at a fixed price.80 Nevertheless, the Newmark court's emphasis upon
RKO's negotiation of the merger and obtaining of the option prior to its public
disclosure!' ignores the fact that RKO would have obtained an unfair benefit or
special advantage by reason of its controlling position even had that option been
granted after public announcement of the impending Frontier-Central merger.
Directly related to the question of the derivation by the insider of any special
benefits is the issue of whether the insider receiving equity securities of another
issuer upon a corporate reorganization realizes a profit by reason of the re-
organization. Realization in an economic sense seems to occur where an in-
sider receives cash or debt securities upon the reorganization. It appears that
the lack of realization should be taken into account in determining whether
a particular reorganization or other non-cash transaction yields the possibility
of speculative abuse.3 "
D. Reorganizations Intervening Between Cash Transactions:
The Concept of "Issuer"
A review of Newmark, Crane, Kern and Gold points to the further question
of whether Section 16(b) liability will be triggered if, within a six-month period,
the insider has effected a cash purchase and a cash sale of the securities of the
two issuers involved in the intervening reorganization. In Crane, the district court
was confronted with purchases of Air Brake securities (whereby Crane became
a statutory insider), the intervening Air Brake-American Standard merger, and
Crane's cash sales of American Standard securities, all of which occurred within
a six-month period. Recognizing that the Second Circuit's decision in Kern
cast doubt upon its prior finding that Crane had effected a "sale" of the Air
Brake shares upon the merger with American Standard, the Crane court re-
considered its decisions and determined that Section 16(b) liability should still
be imposed because Crane had effected a cash purchase of Air Brake shares
76 212 F.2d at 85-86.
77 Id. at 83-85.
78 425 F.2d at 353-54.
79 [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. % 94,186, at 94,796 (4th Cir. 1973).
80 425 F.2d at 353-54.
81 Id. at 353.
82 See generally Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
922 (1972), where the court rejected, in dictum, the plaintiff's contention of § 16(b) liability
as "[the defendant] gained nothing but the benefits of the merger itself." 449 F.2d at 86.
83 346 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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within six months of its subsequent cash sales of American Standard shares.5 "
The Crane court thus appears implicitly to have held that such cash purchases
and sales within the statutory six-month period may be matched despite the fact
that the transactions involved the securities of two different issuers.
The Supreme Court in Kern did not have to address this question because
more than six months elapsed from the date that Occidental became a statutory
insider of Kern until the date of its subsequent cash sale of the Tenneco shares
upon exercise of the option. 5 In this respect, the Court, in viewing the Oc-
cidental-Tenneco option, was careful to note that it was not exercisable until the
expiration of the six-month period, "a period that, under the statute itself, is
assumed to dissipate whatever trading advantage that might be imputed to a
major stockholder with inside information." " The fact that the Court, had it
found the potential for speculative abuse, might well have matched Occidental's
cash purchase of Kern shares with its subsequent grant of an option with respect
to Tenneco shares within the statutory period could be interpreted as support for
the theory that transactions in the securities of two different issuers may be
matched under certain circumstances. However, the Court's statement that it
did not find "a sufficient possibility for the speculative abuse of inside information
with respect to Old Kern's affairs to warrant a holding that the option agreement
was itself a 'sale' " could indicate that the Court treated the option as relating
to shares of Kern rather than to the Tenneco shares later acquired by Occidental
upon the merger." This treatment may be justified because the merger had not
yet been consummated and because the Tenneco shares had not been issued as of
the date of grant of the option. If the Court so regarded the option, the "two
issuer" problem was not presented; and the Kern. decision would not support the
rationale of the Supplemental Opinion in Crane. In view of the fact that Crane
may still have some precedential value in this area, counsel would be well advised
to recommend to statutory insider clients that they defer their cash sales until
more than six months have expired since their cash purchases, despite the inter-
vening non-cash, extraordinary transaction occasioned by the reorganization.
The type of analysis utilized in Crane, which is implicit in matching trans-
actions in the securities of two different issuers, reflects a blurring of the "issuer"
concept when dealing with corporate reorganizations. Since Section 16(b)
speaks in terms of purchases and sales of the securities of a single "issuer,"' this
type of analysis may be inappropriate where an intervening corporate reorganiza-
tion results in the acquisition or transfer by an insider of securities of an entity
84 Id. at 1167-68.
85 Occidental had become a statutory insider by May 10, 1967. 411 U.S. at 585. The
option, granted by Occidental on June 2, 1967, was exercised on December 11, 1967. Id. at
589.
86 Id. at 603.
87 Id. at 601. See text accompanying note 130 infra.
88 The Court could have analyzed the transaction in a manner similar to that employed
by the Seventh Circuit in Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971), in order to find that a "sale" of Kern shares had occurred despite the
granting of a call option on the Tenneco preferred shares. Such a finding would have been
more easily reached if, for example, Occidental had granted to Tenneco the right to vote Occi-
dental's Kern shares. For a detailed analysis of Bershad see text beginning at note 126 infra.
89 Section 16(b) speaks in terms of an equity security "of such issuer .. . ." 15 U.S.C. §
78pi(b) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
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distinct from the predecessor in which the insider originally purchased securities.
From the standpoint of assets, business or history of operations, there is little
justification for equating Air Brake with American Standard or for equating any
of the predecessor corporations with its successor in the other cases.
However, Crane does not represent the first instance arising under Section
16(b) in which courts have construed the term "issuer" to denote both the suc-
cessor and the predecessor corporation. In Blau v. Oppenheim, a district court
in 1966 was confronted with the question of whether a holder of the shares of the
surviving corporation could institute an action under Section 16(b), without
complying with the contemporaneous ownership requirement applicable to deriva-
tive actions, where the predecessor corporation transferred all of its assets, includ-
ing its causes of action, to the corporate successor. The court answered this
question affirmatively. A negative answer under the facts of Oppenheim would
have effectively precluded the only potential plaintiffs from bringing the action,
thereby insulating the defendant from liability for his short-swing profits."1
Nevertheless, since the assumption that both the acquired and acquiring corpora-
tions constitute the same "issuer" is inconsistent with the language of Section
16(b), it would appear that Oppenheim should be construed as relating solely
to the issue of standing and is of dubious precedential value for the conclusion
that equity securities of different entities should be matched in order to invoke
liability under the statute.9 2
There are nevertheless instances where a court would appear to be justified
in treating two related entities as a single "issuer" for purposes of Section 16(b).
This is consistent with the general approach of the courts to interpret the statute
by focusing upon the substance of a particular transaction notwithstanding its
form. This pragmatic approach to the interpretation of the term "issuer" could
also serve to relieve an insider from potential statutory liability under some cir-
curnstances. An analogy may be drawn to the Second Circuit's holding in Blau v.
Mision Corp.9" that a corporate insider did not effect a "sale" of the shares of the
issuer upon transferring them to the insider's wholly-owned subsidiary (in ex-
change for shares of the subsidiary), because there was merely a transfer "between
corporate pockets." This holding was extended by Blau v. Lamb94 to a 97%-held
subsidiary of the corporate parent, the court indicating that, while it could not fix
a precise limit with respect to this question, the transfer of securities to such sub-
sidiary in no way increased the corporate insider's potential ability to abuse inside
90 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
91 Id. at 883-84.
92 See generally SEC Rule 16b-7, which exempts from § 16(b) the acquisition and dis-
position of securities pursuant to certain parent-subsidiary mergers. It contains the following:
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if an officer, director or stockholder shall
make any purchase (other than a purchase exempted by this rule or any other rule
under Section 16(b) of the Act) of a security in any company involved in the merger
or consolidation and any security (other than a sale exempted by this rule or any
other rule under Section 16(b) of the Act) of a security in any other company
involved in the merger or consolidation within any period of less than 6 months
during which the merger or consolidation took place the exemption provided by this
rule shall be unavailable to such officer, director, or stockholder to the extent of
such purchase and sale.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-7(c) (1973).
93 212 F.2d 77 "(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
94 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
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information. Nevertheless, it would not appear reasonable to apply the approach
derived from the forgoing decisions to factual situations such as Crane, where the
two merged entities were unrelated prior to the merger.
E. The Relationship Between Kern and Reliance
The significance of Kern should also be assessed in light of the Supreme
Court's 1972 decision in the case of Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric
Co. 5 In Reliance, the Court employed an automatic approach to the interpreta-
tion of statutory language which appears to sanction the splitting of transactions
by a more-than-10% holder of the issuer's securities. Reliance arose out of an
aborted attempt by Emerson to acquire control of Dodge Manufacturing Com-
pany. Pursuant to a tender offer, Emerson acquired approximately 13% of the
outstanding common shares of Dodge. However, the management of Dodge re-
jected Emerson's offer and agreed to merge with Reliance. After Dodge share-
holder approval had been obtained, Emerson embarked upon a plan admittedly
calculated to minimize its Section 16(b) liability. It arranged for two separate
cash sales of its Dodge shares, the first of which reduced Emerson's holdings below
the 10% level; the second sale was effected shortly thereafter. Both sales of the
Dodge shares occurred within six months of their purchase. The Supreme Court
held that the second sale was beyond the purview of the statute." Although
Reliance may at first appear inconsistent with Kern, Section 16(b) is expressly
made inapplicable to "any transaction where [the more-than-10% shareholder]
was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale ... ."" By reason of this
express statutory caveat and the fact that all of Emerson's purchases or sales
consisted of cash transactions, the two decisions can be reconciled. There is
nothing in the Court's decision in Reliance which suggests that Section 16(b)
requires an automatic approach when extraordinary, non-cash transactions are
under scrutiny. Indeed, the fact that the Kern decision was rendered within a
year after Reliance indicates that the Court did not view its decision in Reliance
as representing anything other than an interpretation of the application of the
statute to cash transactions in the context of the express statutory caveat.9 8
While the holding in Reliance appears to be justified, the decision has
troubling implications, particularly if one of the two or more split transactions
undertaken by the holder of more than 10% of the shares involves a non-cash
transaction. The interpretation of the express statutory caveat in Reliance,
if applied to a non-cash transaction occurring in a series of split purchases or sales
of securities, could lead to uneven results regardless of whether the potential for
unfair insider trading, as defined by the Court in Kern, is prevalent in all such
instances. It is appropriate to note that some insiders, such as Occidental and
Crane which held more than 22% and 32%, respectively, of the outstanding
shares of target companies which they sought to, would have found the statutory
caveat of limited, if any, comfort, whereas other insiders, such as Emerson,
95 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
96 Id. at 419.
97 15 U.S.C. § 78p'(b) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
98 See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAav. L. Rxv. 1, 295 n.29 (1973).
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which held but 13% of the target company's outstanding shares, could rely on
the caveat."9 Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen how the courts
will react in the future to an extraordinary, non-cash transaction where the
speculative abuse test would presumably be applicable, but where the 10%
holder would seek to rely on the statutory caveat. As a practical matter,
future tender offerors confronted by hostile managements will follow the splitting
technique which Reliance sanctions if their holdings of the issuer's shares are not
so substantial as to make splitting economically inadvisable. If the transaction
does not lend itself to splitting, other methods may be used to avoid Section 16(b)
liability, including postponing the consummation of the reorganization beyond
the statutory period or attempting to structure the transaction in accordance with
the tests of Kern.'
Another aspect of the Reliance decision which is potentially troubling is
reflected in the dissenting opinion in which Justice Douglas sought to apply the
speculative abuse test to cash sales and purchases of securities.1 This position
seems to be inconsistent with the definition of the test enunciated in Lamb0 2 and
Kernm.' If the speculative abuse test were applied to the facts of Reliance, it is
arguable, particularly in light of Kern, that since Emerson was not privy to inside
information and did not control the course of the Dodge-Reliance defensive
merger, there was no potential for speculative abuse on the part of Emerson.o 4
It is nevertheless doubtful that a court would apply the speculative abuse test to
cash transactions within the statutory period.'05 However, the problem of whether
99 See id. at 300 n.48.
100 With respect to the question of splitting securities transactions, the Proposed Federal
Securities Code would overrule the result reached in Reliance by providing that
section [1413] applies with respect to (1) a purchase that makes a person a more
than 10 percent owner . . . and '(2) a sale within less than six months after the
purchase whether or not the seller has that status at the time of sale.
ALI Fro. SEC. CODE § 1413(d) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). As Emerson became a more-than-
10% shareholder on June 16, 1967 and effected its split sales on August 28, 1967 and Sep-
tember 11, 1967, under § 1413(d) liability would ensue. Section 1413 of the Code is more
fully discussed at note 191 infra.
101 404 U.S. 418, 427 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
102 See 363 F.2d 507, 514-20 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
103 See 411 U.S. at 591-95.
104 See 404 U.S. at 420.
105 The Supreme Court in Kern seems to have disposed of the possibility of applying the
speculative abuse test to ordinary cash transactions:
Once the merger and exchange were approved, Occidental was left with no real
choice with respect to the future of its shares of Old Kern .... Occidental could, of
course, have disposed of its shares of Old Kern for cash before the merger was closed.
Such an act would have been a § 16(b) sale and would have left Occidental with a
prima facie § 16(b) liability.
411 U.S. at 600 (emphasis supplied).
See Schur v. Salzman, CCH CURRENT FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,370, at 95,257 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). In Schur, the defendant, an insider of Odell, Inc., sold his controlling block of shares
of that corporation to Papercraft Corp. In addition, the defendant agreed to (1) resign as
an officer and director of Odell; (2) use his best efforts to amend Odell's by-laws with respect
to directors; (3) cause all but five directors to resign and a named individual to be elected
Chairman of the Board of Odell; and (4) waive his right to salary from Odell under an em-
ployment agreement. The sale occurred within six months of purchases by the defendant -of
Odell shares. Subsequently, Odell was merged into Papercraft. The defendant argued that
his sale transactions were "beyond the pale of section 16(b) because they were not the
usual 'garden-variety' type . . . ." Id. at 95,258. Despite the fact that purchase and sale
transactions were made solely for cash, the court, in rejecting the defendant's contention,
noted that
considering defendant's insider position, his special knowledge of the facts surrounding
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the split transactions constitute "legally tied" sales, which was alluded to by the
Court in Reliance, may be disposed of by an inquiry into the substance of the
transactions similar to that involved in the application of the speculative abuse
test.Y0 6
F. Illustrative Problem Areas
Several problems arise in attempting to extend the rationale of Kern to other
factual settings. While Kern found no liability in the context of a transaction
involving two competing bids for control of an issuer, Newmark and Gold in-
dicate that liability under Section 16(b) may be imposed for securities transac-
tions in non-contested reorganizations. Questions remain concerning the applica-
tion of the speculative abuse test to those transactions which may be the subject
of a contest between two or more competing groups, but where the specific insider
occupies a neutral position or where the relationship between the insider and
management, or other competing control groups, vacillates during the relevant
period. In addition, it remains to be seen what weight will be given by the courts
to either of the "access-control" variables or whether the other legitimate con-
siderations noted elsewhere in this article will be evaluated in determining
whether Section 16(b) liability should be invoked in a particular corporate
reorganization.
The following prototype situations may be instructive in seeking answers
to these questions:
(1) X purchases for cash more than 10% of the outstanding securities of
Corporation A, and thereby becomes a statutory insider. At the time of acquisi-
tion of that block of securities, X also obtains control of A's board of directors.
X, after reviewing A's prospects, believes that it is in the best interests of A and
all of A's shareholders to merge with a larger and financially stronger company.
Within six months of his purchase, X arranges a merger of A into Corporation B
pursuant to which B issues its equity securities to the shareholders of A. This
merger was not contemplated at the time that X acquired his status as a statutory
insider of A, but X plays a significant role in the decisions affecting the merger.
X derives no benefit under the terms of the merger which is not shared equally
by other holders of the same classes of securities of A. Although X can demon-
strate that the purchase of more than 10% of the shares of A was not made in
contemplation of the merger, it would appear that his control relationship and
access to inside information concerning A, as well as his ability to influence the
terms of the merger, will likely result in the imposition of liability in light of
Papercraft's interest in acquiring Odell, his participation in the negotiations, and his
awareness that his shares . . . were deemed vital by the acquiring interests, there
existed the possibility of abuse of inside knowledge ....
Id. at 95,259 '(emphasis supplied). Cf. Selas v. Voogd, CCH CURRENT FED. SEc. L. REPl.
94,374, at 95,292 (E.D. Pa. 1973), where the court, in determining whether or not the defen-
dant was an officer of the issuer within the meaning of 16(b), concluded that "it cannot be said
that he did not have access to inside information as contemplated by § 16(b) of the Lxchange]
Act." Id. 95,294. See also note 112 infra.
106 See generally Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971). A detailed analysis of Bershad begins at text accompanying note 126
infra.
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Newmark and Gold. The statutory presumption cannot be rebutted by conten-
tions based upon the notion that X has not abused his control position or un-
fairly appropriated inside information for his own benefit, as potential, rather
than actual, abuse is the governing criterion under the test.
(2) X has become a statutory insider of Corporation A by virtue of his
purchases of more than 10% of the outstanding shares of A. X has no control of
the issuer's board of directors and must contend with a hostile management
group competing for control of A. The antagonism between X and the other
competing control group can only be resolved through the arrangement by the
competing group of a merger of A into Corporation B within six months of the
date from which X became a statutory insider. X is not aware of the proposed
merger prior to its public announcement, and has little, if any, power to thwart its
consummation. Throughout this period, X has continued to purchase shares of
A in an effort to outbid the competing group for ultimate control. In this in-
stance, the facts are considerably closer to those confronting the Supreme Court
in Kern, and it is arguable that an application of the speculative abuse test
should result in the absence of liability under the statute. Here, the finding might
turn upon whether X, the statutory insider, is able to exert such influence upon
the transactions resulting in the merger as to be comparable to RKO in Newmark
or Sloan in Gold. It would appear that the Crane counterargument that X, in
continuing to purchase securities during the relevant period, realizes that he can
reap profits from the contest for control of A, has been repudiated by the Supreme
Court's holding in Kern that such short-swing profit calculations not derived from
inside information are not with the purview of the concept of speculative abuse."'
However, where it can be demonstrated that X has such access, despite the fact
that the hostile competing group is solely responsible for arranging and negotiat-
ing the merger, X might be held liable under Kern.0 8
(3) X, an officer or director of Corporation A, purchases shares of A
within six months prior to a merger of A into Corporation B. X exercises no per-
ceptible control over the timing or terms of the extraordinary transaction and
does not have access to the kind of confidential information which Kern deems
determinative. Gold suggests the appropriateness of a case-by-case analysis of
the particular insider's access to confidential information. It would appear that
X would be more likely to succeed in rebutting the statutory presumption of
access if he were in a position analogous to that of Occidental in Kern, rather
than an officer or director of A, involved in the daily functions of corporate
management.10 9
107 411 U.S. at 597-98.
108 The failure to rebut the presumption of access to inside information would, in itself,
seem sufficient under Kern for the imposition of liability. See 411 U.S. at 598-99.
109 A variation of this case would occur where the only information concerning the
reorganization that X receives comes as a result of public statements made by the issuer. The
analysis of the majority in Gold with respect to the defendant, Scurlock, emphasized that he
obtained information concerning the issuer on substantially the same basis as all other share-
holders. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. If 94,186, at 94,796 (4th Cir. 1973).
The dissent, however, argued that
[t]he statute draws no distinction between "active" and "passive" directors and, in
the absence of evidence that a director did not in fact discharge the duties normally
associated with that position, a conclusion that a director was not privy to inside
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(4) X has become a substantial shareholder of Corporation A prior to
the time that A's management proposes to effect a merger with Corporation
B. The shares of X may constitute the crucial "swing vote" necessary to obtain
approval of the merger by A's shareholders. X does not have knowledge of the
impending merger at the time he effects his cash purchases of the shares of A.
The question presented is whether Section 16(b) liability may be affected by the
manner in which X votes. The Supreme Court in Kern carefully noted the
actions taken by Occidental at the Kern shareholders' meeting which approved
the reorganization. The Court observed that under the applicable state law
Occidental's abstention was tantamount to a negative vote but that dissenters'
appraisal rights were not available to it."' However, since Kern had the
necessary votes to effect the merger without the favorable votes of Occidental,
the Court was not obliged to pass upon the effects of its action at the shareholder
level."'
Where a shareholder's negative vote, or an abstention which is tantamount
thereto, would represent a futile effort to defeat a proposed reorganization, there
would seem to be no reason in law to require it. Where the ultimate approval
respecting the reorganization may be dependent upon the insider's vote, the ra-
tionale for imposing liability upon the insider who votes in favor of the transac-
tion would be based upon a concept of control. "Control" in this context would
necessarily consist of the power to thwart the consummation of the reorganization
rather than the power to arrange for and negotiate the transaction. However,
this argument appears to overlook the Kern analysis that the concept of control
subsumes access to inside information. Moreover, if a finding of control were
based solely upon the power to block a reorganization, the insider, in order to
avoid Section 16(b) liability, might well be inclined to take action to attempt to
thwart a transaction which may well be of benefit to all shareholders of the cor-
poration. Nevertheless, careful practitioners, representing an insider holding the
"swing vote" in a contested or non-contested reorganization, might recommend
information would seem to be at odds with the congressional intent.
Id. at 94,805.
It remains unclear as to the type of inside information with which the statute is con-
cerned. The majority in Gold, focusing on pre-merger relationships, seems to have confined
its analysis to inside information with respect to the particular reorganization transaction. In
analyzing the defendant, Sloan, the majority stated that
the only relevant distinction to be made between Sloan and the other defendants ...
is that Sloan possessed specific financial information concerning ARC and Susque-
hanna between the date of the August directors' meeting of ARC and the distribution
of the proxy statement in October. Sloan, and no other defendant, had knowledge
of certain inside information that would have helped him to predict the future per-
formance of Susquehanna; such knowledge is the source of his "possibility of specu-
lative abuse" . ..
Id. at 94,801 (emphasis supplied).
The dissent, in analyzing the possibility of speculative abuse during the post-merger period,
appears to have been concerned with the varying relationships of the insiders to the corporation,
i.e., Susquehanna in general. Id. at 94,802-07.
110 411 U.S. at 600.
111 Id. at 599. In Gold, the majority refused to impose liability upon the defendant, Scur-
lock. despite the fact that he cast the deciding vote in favor of a resolution of the ARC Board
of Directors submitting the proposed merger with Susquehanna to the ARC shareholders for
approval. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,186, at 94,794-99 (4th Cir.
1913); cf. id. at 94,804-05 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
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that the insider avoid any implication of speculative abuse by at least abstaining
from voting with respect to the proposed merger?"
Judicial guidance has enabled insiders and their counsel to make informed
judgments as to the appropriate course to follow in order to avoid liability under
Section 16 (b). As these prototypes illustrate, however, significant interpretative
problems in the area of non-cash, extraordinary transactions still remain.
III. Insider Transactions in Options and Other Stock Rights
The statutory consequences of insider transactions in put and call options
and other stock rights1 5 represent another significant concern under Section
16(b). A put option is a contract giving the holder the right to sell to the writer
of the contract a certain number of shares of an issuer's securities at a fixed price
on or before a certain date. A call option is a similar contract giving the bearer
the right to buy securities. Both types of option contracts are ordinarily sold by
the writer for a "premium," determined by the price of the shares, past and
projected market fluctuations, and the difference or "spread" between the
option's exercise price and the prevailing market price of the underlying shares."1
In contrast to corporate reorganizations, which typically are "extraordinary"
transactions not readily identified as a "purchase" or "sale," ordinary insider
trading for cash in transferable put and call options, warrants, and other stock
112 The defendant by casting a negative vote and demanding appraisal rights, would seem
to be exposing himself to potential § 16 (b) liability. Since there is no reason to suppose that a
cash sale of the issuer's securities back to the issuer at the initiation of the seller is not a § 16(b)
"sale," the defendant would be confronted with an unrealistic alternative of prima facie § 16(b)
liability as opposed to a subjective analysis into the transaction as a whole. See generally 411
U.S. at 600. Moreover, the value of the dissenter's shares for appraisal purposes is determined
subsequent to the dissenter's applying therefor. See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 262(b), (c)
'(1973), which provides that an appraiser will be appointed by the court if the dissenter and the
corporation are unable to agree upon the value of the dissenter's shares. A dissenting share-
holder may subsequently withdraw his objections and participate in the merger or consolidation
if he obtains the written consent of the corporation. See id. § 262(i). There seems to be no
basis in requiring the dissenter to gamble upon the determination of a court-appointed appraiser
as against the "merger-determined value" when he has not participated in determining the latter.
See generally Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959). Moreover, even if a sale is deemed to have occurred, the question arises as to the
appropriate date of sale. The "irrevocably bound" test, see note 143 infra, is of little aid if the
dissenting shareholder is permitted to withdraw his objections and participate in the reorganiza-
tion tranisaction. If the date of actual transfer of shares for cash is used, the transaction may
very well be outside the six-month period of § 16(b). See note 154 infra. The Proposed Federal
Securities Code specifically exempts "an incidental cash sale pursuant to dissenters' appraisal
rights" from the insider short-swing proscriptions of § 1413, subject to the defendant's proving
that "he did not use information obtained by reason of his relationship to an involved
issuer . . . ." ALI FED. SEC. ConE § 1413(h) (1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). Section 1413
of the Code is more fully discussed at note 191 infra.
The fact that both the acquisition and disposition of a security involve cash should not
necessarily relegate the series of transactions to a literal application of the statute. The charac-
terization of a transaction as either "ordinary" (i.e., one which the statute is designed to auto-
matically proscribe) or "extraordinary" (i.e., one in which a subjective analysis is under-
taken) should not depend upon the form of the consideration transferred by the parties, but
rather upon the character and background of the transaction in light of statutory purpose. Cf.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & West. Indus., Inc., CCH CURRENT FED. SEC. L. REP. ff
94,421, at 95,430 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1974) (distinguishing Kern on the ground that Occi-
dental's "sale" in Kern was involuntary).
113 The term "other stock rights" is used in this article to include all transferable and
non-transferable employee stock options, stock warrants, and other stock acquisition rights.
114 See H. FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 20-24 (1959); Comment,
Put and Call Options under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE L.J. 868,
869 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 YALE Comment].
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acquisition rights appears to pose no special problems under Section 16(b).
Transferable options bear some similarity to convertible securities because they
fluctuate in value depending upon the market price of the underlying securities."'
However, transferable options, unlike convertible securities, are securities which
may be purchased or sold separately from the underlying shares."' Since trading
in transferable options is thus the functional equivalent of a purchase and sale
of the underlying securities, the statutory presumption of abuse of inside infor-
mation appears appropriate where an insider has derived short-swing profits from
the cash purchase and sale of a transferable put or call option within six
months."7 The potential for insider speculation may be considerably increased
through the use of put and call options because the premium for an option is
typically small in relation to the value of the underlying securities, and short-term
market fluctuations in such securities are usually reflected in the cost of the op-
tion." While there previously was some question whether all transferable options
and other stock rights could be considered "equity securities of such issuer" with-
in the meaning of Section 16(b),"' a 1973 SEC amendment to Rule 3a11-1 now
confirms that put and call options are within the Exchange Act's definition of
"equity security.""'
115 See 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at 869.
116 An option merely constitutes a "right" to purchase the underlying securities, whereas
convertible securities are in reality a "package" of junior and senior securities of the issuer.
This difference is manifested in the fact that the time for payment of the consideration for the
underlying shares occurs upon exercise, not acquisition, of an option, while no payment is
typically made for the shares acquired upon conversion of convertible securities.
117 See, e.g., Michaely & Lee, Put and Call Options: Criteria for Applicability of Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 239, 240-42 (1965);
1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114 at 869-70, 875; Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions
Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 485 (1947).
An insider with access to inside information that the value of his corporation's shares will in-
crease has the potential to realize short-swing profits from the purchase and sale within six
months of a call option, which will increase in value as the value of the shares increases. Con-
versely, if the inside information is unfavorable to the corporation, the insider has the po-
tential to reap speculative profits from the purchase and sale within six months of a put
option, which will increase in value as the value of the shares declines.
118 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at 869.
119 "Equity security" is specifically defined in § 3(a)'(11) of the -Exchange Act as
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or without considera-
tion, into such a security; or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase
such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any other security which the Com-
mission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors, to treat as an equity security.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (11) (1970) (emphasis supplied). Prior to 1973, the SEC had not exercised
its discretion to include put and call options within the definition of "equity security" and had
not indicated whether such options might otherwise come within that definition. A call option
always appeared to come within the definition of "equity security" because it can easily be classi-
fied as a "warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase" the shares of the insider's corporation.
See 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at 874. But see Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising
Co., 223 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964)(non-assignable call was held not to be an "equity security"). Put options were not as clearly
included, because the definition makes no specific reference to rights to dispose of, rather than
to purchase or acquire, the underlying shares. However, it was urged that puts should be con-
sidered "securities" within the meaning of the definition of "equity security" because they
can be used for the same speculative purposes as calls and because § 16's goal of eliminating
all insider speculation is best furthered by construing the definition as broadly as possible. See
Note, Puts and Calls under Section 16(b): Is a New Approach Needed?, 7 GEORGIA L. REV.
153, 158-62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 GEORGIA Note].
120 The amended Rule 3all-i, effective June 15, 1973, provides:
The term "equity security" is hereby defined to include any stock or similar security,
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However, the application of Section 16(b) to insider option transactions
has been much less clear where an insider has not both purchased and sold the
options for a profit and where the only matchable transactions within the
statutory six-month period are the insider's acquisition or disposition of the
option and his cash sale or purchase of the underlying securities.'2 Such "extraor-
certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, voting trust certificate or certificate
of deposit for an equity security, limited partnership interest, interest in a joint
venture, or certificate of interest in a business trust; or any security convertible,
with or without consideration into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any put,
call, straddle, or other option or privilege of buying such a security from or selling
such a security to another without being bound to do so.
SEC Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 10129, SEC Reg. § 240.3a-11, 38 Fed. Reg. 11449 (1973)
(emphasis supplied). Although the amendment was primarily intended to make it clear that
the Federal Reserve Board has authority under § 7(d) of the Exchange Act, 12 U.S.C. §
78g(d) (1970), to regulate the extension or maintenance of credit by banks with respect to
such options, see SEC Sec. EL. Act Rel. No. 10129 (1973), the revised definition of "equity
security" is generally applicable throughout the Exchange Act.
Even after the amendment to Rule 3all-1 specifically including put and call options
within the definition of "equity security," it could be argued that privately issued puts and
calls should not be deemed "equity securities of such issuer" (emphasis supplied) within the
meaning of § 16(b) since the "issuer" referred to is clearly the corporation whose securities
are registered under the Exchange Act rather than the issuer of the options. The amended
Rlie makes no explicit reference to the "issuer" question, although the revised definition ap-
pears to contemplate that the options will be deemed equity securities of the issuer of the
underlying shares. In any case, it has been generally acknowledged that private puts and calls
are within the scope of § 16(b) because the word "of" can reasonably be construed to mean
"relating to" or "pertaining to" rather than "issued by" the insider's corporation. See Laufer,
Effect of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act on Use of Options by Insiders, 8 N.Y.L.
FoRubi 232, 236 (1962) rhereinafter cited as Laufer]; 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at
873-74.
The SEC recently has exhibited increased interest in regulating the issuance and trading
of put and call options. New SEC Rule 9b-1, effective January 7, 1974, prohibits all ex-
changes and exchange members from engaging in the trading of any options unless such option
trading is conducted pursuant to a plan declared effective by the Commission. See SEC Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. No. 10552, SEC Reg. § 240.9b-1 (1973). See also Proposed Reg. § 230.238, SEC
Sec. Act Rel. No. 5366 (1973) (Proposed Rule 238 promulgated under the Securities Act of
1933, which would provide an exemption from the registration requirement of that Act for the
options meeting certain specified conditions); Proposed Reg. § 240.9b-2, SEC Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
No. 9994 (1973) (Proposed Rule 9b-2 promulgated under the Exchange Act, which would
establish certain suitability, disclosure, net capital and reporting requirements applicable to
broker-dealers engaging in option transactions).
121 Prior to the amendment to Rule 3all-i, it was suggested that if an option is itself a
security, it may be possible to match transactions in the underlying shares and in the option
on the ground that both transactions are in securities of the issuer of the same class. 2 Loss,
supra note 3, at 1059-60. See Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1967) '(an issuer's common shares and convertible debentures are equity securities of the same
class so that for the purpose of determining beneficial ownership of the class, an insider's com-
mon shares may be aggregated with the number of common shares into which the debentures
it owns are convertible); Simon v. Sunasco, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] OCH FED. S ac. L.
REP. %[ 92,547 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (an insider was the indirect owner of the common shares into
which the special shares that it held were then convertible).
Furthermore, it has been urged that it may be possible to match an insider's acquisition or
disposition of an option with his transaction in the underlying securities because the option is,
in effect, a contract to purchase or sell the underlying securities. 1972 GEORorA Note 159-62.
Under this view, an insider's sale of the underlying securities would be matched with his
acquisition of a call option, which would be deemed a "contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire" the underlying securities within the Exchange Act's definition of "purchase." 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1970); see note 10 supra. Conversely, an insider's purchase of the
underlying securities could be matched with his acquisition of a put option, which would he
deemed a "contract to sell or dispose of" the underlying securities within the meaning of the
definition of "sale." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1970) ; see note 11 supra. Similarly, the insider's
grant of a call option would be deemed a "sale" which could be matched with his purchase of
the underlying securities, and his grant of a put option would be deemed a "purchase" of the
underlying securities which could be matched with their sale. It has been suggested, however,
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dinary" insider option transactions have been most notable in two dearly
distinct contexts. First, in the area of corporate reorganizations, prospective
tender offerors, who became statutory insiders by purchasing more than 10%
of an issuer's equity securities, have occasionally found it advantageous (for
reasons related to the attempted bid for control) to either acquire or grant a
call option for a large block of such securities within six months of their cash
purchases thereof. Their motives in acquiring or granting such options have
included the desire to lock up a sufficient number of shares of the issuer to assure
the success of the attempt to obtain control of the issuer"2" or to be extricated from
a minority position in a larger corporation which has blocked the prospective
acquirer's tender offer by merging with the issuer. 2 ' The second major open
area is whether Section 16(b) consequences should attach to an insider's acqui-
sition of employee stock options from an issuer where the options are not resold
by the insider for cash. The acquisition of employee options may be deemed to
constitute an "extraordinary" transaction for Section 16(b) purposes because
such options are rarely acquired for cash and are granted by the corporation for
purposes which are not related to insider short-term speculation."
that an option may represent nothing more than an offer to purchase or sell the underlying
securities. See 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at 884.
In any event, the attempted characterization of an option as a "contract to buy" or a "con-
tract to sell" has not been adopted by the decisions construing the application of § 16(b) to
insider option transactions. In Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962), a share-
holder attempted to recapture the premiums realized by a director from his simultaneous grant
of call options for 1,000 shares and put options for 500 shares. Finding for the defendant,
the court held that the insider's grant of the put and call options could not be deemed a "pur-
chase" and "sale" of his shares of the corporation because the options were one-sided, fixing
the obligations but not the rights of the insider, and because the insider at no time could con-
trol whether the options would be exercised. The court further held that even on the assump-
tion that either half of the straddle was itself an "equity security," there was no sale or
purchase for § 16(b) purposes because the call was never exercised and the put was exercised
more than six months from the date of grant. Id. at 424. The court did not even consider
the rather obvious possibility of matching the issuance of the puts as a "contract to sell" with
the issuance of the calls as a "contract to buy" the insider's securities. See also cases cited at
text accompanying notes 125 to 136 infra.
122 See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970).
123 See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
124 See text at note 180 infra. In contrast, there are other types of "extraordinary" insider op-
tion transactions-in which the only matchable transactions within the statutory six-month period
are the insider's acquisition (or disposition) of an option and his cash sale '(or purchase) of
the underlying securities-where the potential to realize speculative profits is more apparent.
For example, it has been suggested that insiders have the ability to manipulate options to
realize speculative profits in so-called "profit-freezing" transactions: An insider who has ap-
preciated securities and inside information that the value of his shares will decline can freeze
his profit without engaging in a prohibited sale within six months of his purchase by acquiring
a put option at the then current market price. The insider can then exercise the put option
after the shares have declined in value and after six months has run from his initial purchase
of the shares. He would thus realize all the profit he could have realized through his sale of
the shares at the time he acquired the inside information, less only the minimal premium he
paid for the option. 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at 883-890.
These possible insider option transactions have not appeared in the decisions. However,
it is likely that in the future insiders realizing profits from such transactions would be deemed
liable under § 16(b) on the ground that the transactions are not significantly different from
ordinary insider trading in options and thus present the potential for speculative abuse under
the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Kern. See text accompanying note 130 infra.
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A. Option Transactions Related to Corporate Reorganizations
In three decisions in 1970 and 1971, the Second and Seventh Circuits were
confronted with the issue of the proper treatment under Section 16(b) of an
insider's acquisition or grant of a call option in the context of contested or non-
contested bids for corporate control. This series of decisions culminated in the
Supreme Court's explicit application of the "speculative abuse" test to such
option transactions in its Kern decision in 1973.
In Newmark, the Second Circuit held that RKO's option to acquire the
controlling block of Central securities constituted a "purchase" which could be
matched with its "sale" of the shares occasioned by the merger of Central into
Frontier within six months thereafter. However, because RKO's acquisition of
the option, its exercise of the option, and the merger all took place within a
period of six months, it was not necessary for the court to determine whether the
"purchase" occurred upon the date of the option's grant or its exercise.25 The
Seventh Circuit considered that very question in Bershad v. McDonough,2"
where a husband and wife, who collectively owned more than 10% of the out-
standing shares of an issuer, granted a call option to a prospective acquiring
corporation within six months of the grantors' cash purchases of such shares, but
where the grantee's exercise of the option occurred after the expiration of that
six-month period. Examining all the circumstances in order to determine whether
the grant of that option amounted to a "sale" of the underlying shares for Section
16(b) purposes, the court held that the large size of the "binder" paid for the
option, representing more than 14% of the total purchase price of the shares,
the grant of irrevocable proxies to the grantee to vote the shares subject to the
option at any regular or special shareholders meeting, and the replacement of
the grantors with the designees of the grantee on the issuer's board of directors
were sufficient to "clearly indicate that the stock was effectively transferred, for
all practical purposes, long before the exercise of the option."1 " While the court
expressly noted that it was not selecting between the objective approach and the
"speculative abuse" test,1" it appears that the rationale justifying its characteriza-
tion of what was ostensibly a grant of an option as a "sale" of the underlying
securities involved considerations implicit in the speculative abuse test.229
The Supreme Court was faced with an analogous option transaction in
Kern because, while Occidental's grant of a call option on Tenneco preference
shares occurred within six months of its cash tender offer purchases of Kern
shares, the option could not be exercised until six months after the date of grant.
The plaintiff in Kern suggested two grounds for imposing insider liability.
125 See Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 354 '(2d Cir. 1970):
Since all of the events ... transpired within a six-month span during the year 1967,
any purchase and sale which formed a part of these events occurred within the statu-
tory period. Similarly, by any rational definition, RKO's exchange of $7,550,082.50
in cash for Central's common stock and convertible debentures was a "purchase" of
those securities.
126 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
127 428 F.2d at 698.
128 Id. at 697 n.5.
129 See 59 Ky. L.J. 1015-17 (1971).
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Adverting to the "speculative abuse" test, it urged that Occidental's purchase of
the Old Kern shares and grant of a call option to Tenneco within six months
"was the kind of transaction the statute was designed to prevent ... ." The
Supreme Court held that it did not "find in the execution of the Occidental-
Tenneco option agreement a sufficient possibility for the speculative abuse of
inside information with respect to Old Kern's affairs to warrant holding that
the option agreement was itself a 'sale' within the meaning of § 16(b)."1SO The
Court noted that, while the execution of the option had "mutual advantages"
for both Occidental and Tenneco, the motivation of the grantor-the elimination
of its minority position in Tenneco---did not "smack of insider trading" for the
purpose of realizing speculative profits."' The Court also emphasized that, even
assuming that Occidental had inside information because of its "leverage" in
dealing with Old Kern and Tenneco, no Section 16(b) liability should attach
because it was demonstrated that there was no potential abuse of Occidental's
position as a statutory insider."2 Because the option was a call option, "Occi-
dental could not share in a rising market for the Tenneco stock"; at the time of
the grant of the option, "Occidental had no ownership position in Tenneco giving
it any actual or presumed insights into the future value of Tenneco stock";
because the earliest date for the exercise of the option was more than six months
after its grant, there was a statutory presumption that whatever trading ad-
vantages Occidental possessed at the date of grant would be dissipated before
exercise; at the time of the grant, there was no absolute assurance that the
merger would be effected, so that the option itself could become "null and
void."' 3
Citing Bershad, the plaintiff in Kern also argued that "the agreement
[beween Occidental and Tenneco] was an option in form but a sale in fact."'3 4
The Court noted that, while the plaintiff's argument "has force," recharacteriza-
tion is purely a factual question, "very much a matter of judgment, economic
and otherwise," and it refused to reverse the Second Circuit's holding that Oc-
cidental's grant of the option did not constitute a sale of the underlying shares.
The Court distinguished Bershad on the ground that the Second Circuit had
found in Kern that, based on expert testimony, the premium paid to Occidental
constituted a fair value of the cost of that type of option, there was a real pos-
sibility on the date of grant that the option might never be exercised, the
optionor "did not surrender practically all the emoluments of ownership by
executing the option," and there were no "other special circumstances" indicating
that the parties understood and intended that the option was the equivalent of a
sale. 5 Citing language from the Second Circuit's Kern opinion, the Court noted
130 Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 601 (1973).
131 Id.
132 See Goodman, The Occidental Case, 18 Rav. SEc. REG. 851, 855 (1973). The insider
position argument appears to be the complement of the Supreme Court's holding that there
was no potential for speculative abuse in the exchange of shares pursuant to the merger of
Old Kern and Tenneco because Occidental had no control over the merger negotiations. See
text accompanying note 37 supra.
133 411 U.S. at 601-03.
134 Id. at 601.
135 Id. at 603-04.
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that, unlike Bershad, the Occidental option was not "accompanied by a wink of
the eye .... "136
1. Consequences of the Grant or Acquisition of the Option
The Supreme Court thus appears to have set forth two separate, but inter-
related, tests for the imposition of Section 16(b) liability in the context of a
corporate reorganization where the insider's grant of an option, but not its
exercise, has occurred within six months of the insider's "purchase" (or "sale") of
the underlying shares either for cash or pursuant to the reorganization: whether
the transaction could lead to "speculative abuse" or whether the grant of the
option was in effect a disposition of the underlying securities. With respect to the
"speculative abuse" standard, the Court's refusal to match Occidental's grant of
the option for the Tenneco shares with its prior cash purchase of the Kern shares
establishes that the fact that the insider granted an option for a cash premium in
a transaction which was not made available to other holders of the same class
of securities would not, in itself, be sufficient to trigger Section 16(b) liability.'5 7
However, as noted elsewhere in this article,"' it appears that the distinction
drawn by the Court between inside information and status as a statutory insider
will benefit a more-than-10% shareholder only where the management of the
issuer opposes that shareholder's bid for corporate control. In cases such as
Newmark and Bershad, where the management of the issuer facilitated either the
takeover of control or the reorganization, the potential for speculative abuse is
more likely to be found because the acquiring corporation would ordinarily be
unable to rebut the statutory presumption that it had either access to undisclosed
inside information or some meaningful element of control in the process of
effecting the takeover.
Whether or not the corporate takeover attempt is opposed by the issuer's
management, it is suggested that one of the implications of Kern and Newmark
is that the potential for speculative abuse is more likely to be found if the insider
is a grantee, rather than a grantor, of an option. The Kern Court's conclusion
that there was little potential for Occidental to engage in speculative abuse be-
cause its grant of a call option "by its very form, left Occidental with no choice
but to sell if Tenneco exercised the option,"'3 9 can be read as an indication that
the Court might, under some circumstances, deem the grantee's discretion to
exercise the option or permit it to expire to constitute the potential for insider
136 Id. at 604 n.30, quoting Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 165
(2d Cir. 1971).
In dealing with the option question, Justice Douglas' dissent concentrated solely upon the
plaintiff's second argument, declaring that he could not agree that there was no basis for find-
ing that Occidental's shares were sold "upon execution of the option." 411 U.S. at 615. He
noted that, just as in Bershad, the premium paid to Occidental was to be credited against the
purchase price. Justice Douglas also argued that Occidental was obligated to vote in favor of
the Tenneco-Old Kern merger if the voting of its shares was necessary for the merger's ap-
proval. He urged that the Court should not have approved the district courtes granting sum-
mary judgment on the question whether "the forfeitable down payment was a reasonable,
non-coercive price." Id. at 616.
137 See text accompanying notes 74 to 82 supra.
138 See text accompanying notes 45 to 61 supra.
139 411 U.S. at 602.
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abuse. 4 ' Nevertheless, because the Court refused to adopt a rigid definition of
"speculative abuse" and looked to all the surrounding circumstances of the Oc-
cidental-Tenneco option, it is probably still open to a grantee of a put or call
option to attempt to avoid Section 16(b) liability by demonstrating either that
the hostile attitude of the issuer's management negated the possibility of access to
inside information or that there were non-speculative motives for the acquisition
and exercise of the option."4
While the parameters of the "speculative abuse" standard as applied to
options in the reorganization context are still somewhat unclear, the Supreme
Court's articulation of the second test-whether the option agreement was in
fact a sale of the underlying securities-appears to be a more useful guide for
planning purposes. It seems that an insider, either as a grantor or grantee, can
guard successfully against a subsequent finding that the grantor surrendered
"practically all the emoluments of ownership" of his shares through a careful
structuring of the option arrangements which avoid the indicia of sale in light
of Bershad and Kern. 42 Accordingly, the parties should avoid including in the
option contract the provisions which were held by the Bershad court to be tan-
tamount to the transfer of beneficial ownership of the shares--the execution by
the grantor of an irrevocable proxy for his shares in favor of the grantee and
the immediate resignation of the insider grantor from the board of directors of
the corporation. Although the Supreme Court in Kern did not specify what
other special circumstances might lead to a finding that the grant of the option
"was accompanied by a wink of the eye" and was in fact a sale of the shares, it
appears that, in the absence of contract provisions or other collateral arrange-
ments clearly pointing to a surrender of the indicia of ownership, a reviewing
court will and should ignore the labels or technical forms utilized by the parties
140 The Court's emphasis on the fact that the Occidental-Tenneco option was a call may
be misplaced. It does not appear that the grant of a put provides the insider-grantor with more
potential for speculative abuse under the Court's "no choice" rationale than does the grant of
a call, because the obligations of the grantor are fixed in both situations.
141 It has been suggested, for example, that a retiring controlling shareholder of a corpora-
tion may seek to use stock options as a device to pass control to a particular individual or
group of insiders. See Laufer, supra note 120, at 241. It appears that the motive of realizing
speculative profits could not reasonably be attributed either to the grantor or the grantee of the
options in such a situation.
142 The Bershad test also has implications under § 16(c) of the Exchange Act, which
provides that
[ilt shall be unlawful for any [more than 10%] beneficial owner, director, or officer,
directly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security), if the person selling the security or his principal (1) does not own
the security sold, or (2) if owning the security, does not deliver it against such sale
within twenty days thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit it
in the mails or other usual channels of transportation; but no person shall be deemed
to have violated this subsection if he proves that notwithstanding the exercise of good
faith he was unable to make such delivery or deposit within such time, or that to do
so would cause undue inconvenience or expense.
15 U.S.C. § 78p'(c) (1970). Subparagraph (1) of § 16(c) effectively prohibits an insider
from selling securities "short," while paragraph (2) prohibits short sales "against the box."
If a grantor of a call option (or a grantee of a put option) is deemed to have effectively sold
his shares underlying the option at the date of grant, notwithstanding that the delivery of the
securities did not occur until the date of exercise (or thereafter), the insider would have made
an illegal short sale of the underlying shares under § 16(c) (1) if he had not purchased them
as of the date of grant, or an illegal sale of the underlying securities against the box under
§ 16(c) (2) if he did own securities at the date of grant but failed to deliver them within
twenty days thereafter.
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and attempt to ascertain the substance of the transaction.m 3 Special circum-
stances suggesting that the grant of the option was in fact a sale of the shares
would appear to include a finding either that the premium for acquisition of the
option was so substantial as to constitute a down payment or that the exercise
price of the option was so insubstantial that it would be unlikely from a realistic
business viewpoint for the grantee to elect not to exercise the option.14
2. Consequences of Exercising the Option
The Supreme Court's adoption of a flexible approach to option transactions
in the corporate reorganization context raises the question of whether the courts
will continue to adhere to the automatic doctrine that an insider's acquisition
of shares for cash upon exercise of the option will always be deemed a "pur-
chase" which may be matched with a cash sale of the underlying securities within
the statutory period.1 41 Since the Kern decision applied the "speculative abuse"
143 The Bershad and Kern decisions appear to endorse a new test for ascertaining an in-
sider's holding period with respect to shares subject to option. Prior decisions have held that
an insider is deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of shares through a "purchase"
when he becomes "irrevocably bound" to complete the transaction. See, e.g., Blau v. Ogsbury,
210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (insider consummated a "purchase" of shares subject to option
when he mailed notice to the issuer and "thereby incurred an irrevocable liability to take and
pay for the stock"); Kramer v. Ayer, 317 F.Supp. 254 "(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (insider did not
acquire shares under a merger agreement until the requisite documents were filed with the ap-
propriate officers of the interested states). See also American Agronomics Corp., 1971 WAsH.
SERV. BUR. INDEX (available May 24, 1971) (interpretative letter of SEC staff indicating that
an insider acquires beneficial ownership of securities, for the purpose of reporting under § 16 (a),
when he takes a "firm commitment for the purchase thereof" but not if "certain conditions must
be satisfied in order to make a transaction binding"). In contrast, Bershad and Kern indicate
that the date of purchase (or sale) of shares subject to option will be related back to the
date of acquisition (or grant) of the option if the "emoluments of ownership?' of the shares
have in fact shifted prior to exercise. It thus appears that, under such circumstances, a
purchase of shares subject to option may be deemed to have occurred even if neither party was
"irrevocably bound" on the date of grant to complete the transaction. See also Champion Home
Builders Co. v. Jeffress, CH CURRENT FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,347, at 95,174-75 (6th Cir. Jan.
11, 1974) (applying both the "irrevocably bound" test and the Bershad "incidents of owner-
ship" test in holding that an insider did not acquire shares in a merger until the agreement
between the acquired and acquiring corporations had been fully executed).
144 One example which illustrates the extent of Kern's departure from the traditional in-
quiries into the scope of purchase and sale under § 16 (b) is the potential short-swing liability for
an insider who has made a gift of an option which is subsequently exercised. Prior to Kern,
it appears that a gift of an option could not be deemed a "purchase" or "sale" under § 16(b).
The gift of the put or call could not be deemed a "sale" of the option itself, because it
was early held that a gift is not a "sale" within the meaning of § 16(b). See, e.g., Shaw v.
Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949). Moreover, there was no
potential for matching the insider's grant of the put or call with his sale or purchase of
the underlying securities within six months, because the grant of the option could not be
deemed a contract to sell within the definition of "sale" or a contract to purchase within the
definition of "purchase" in view of the absence of consideration passing from the grantee to the
grantor. In contrast, under Kern the gift could be deemed to have constituted a ' purchase"
or "sale" of the shares subject to option upon exercise either if there was a potential for insider
speculative abuse or if exercise of the option was sufficiently certain to justify relating back the
transaction in the shares to the date of the gift.
145 See, e.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140. 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907
(1949); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82
(2d Cir. 1951); 1960 YA.nu Comment, supra note 114, at 876. For a decision a~plying the
doctrine to the exercise of employee stock options, see note 189 intra.
It should be noted, however, that the exercise of an option does not involve any "sale" of
the option. See 2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1080; Rubin & Feldman, supra note 117, at 491.
Furthermore, it has been held that because options are not the economic equivalent of the
underlying shares, the acquisition of shares upon exercise of an option is not a "conversion!'
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standard in evaluating the grant or acquisition of options, it could be urged that
the exercise of an option should not be deemed a "purchase" or "sale" for the
purposes of Section 16(b) if it was effected for wholly non-speculative purposes
(e.g., tax planning).' The question gains added importance where the insider's
exercise of options previously granted by the issuer may conceivably be matched
only with an exchange of the equity securities underlying the option in a reorgan-
ization transaction, particularly if the insider was compelled by the impending re-
organization either to exercise his outstanding options or to have them lapse en-
tirely. In such event, it is arguable that neither transaction should be deemed a
"purchase" or "sale" for Section 16(b) purposes if the insider could demonstrate
that there was no potential for the abuse of inside information in the exercise of
the options or the exchange of securities. However, as previously noted with re-
spect to reorganization transactions, 4  it appears that the "speculative abuse" test
is relevant only where it is unclear whether an extraordinary, non-cash transaction
should be deemed a "purchase" or "sale" within the meaning of Section 16 (b).
Since the exercise of the option typically involves a cash purchase or sale where
realization by the optionor or optionee is manifest, the exercise probably could
not be deemed an extraordinary transaction. In that event, there would be no
occasion for applying the "speculative abuse" test of Kern, and a court would
thus have no discretion to refrain from matching the exercise with another trans-
action in the underlying shares. 4 '
of an equity security exempted from the operation of § 16(b) by SEC Rule 16b-9. Brenner
v. Career Academy, Inc., 467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 27 &
116 supra.
146 But see First Lincoln Financial Corp., 1971 WAsH. SERv. BUR. INDEX '(available August
23, 1971) (interpretative letter of SEC staff indicating that § 16(b) allows an insider to effect
a sale and purchase of his company's shares for tax purposes, provided that in such event any
profit he might derive from such transactions inures to and is recoverable by the issuer).
147 See text accompanying note 105 supra.
148 Nevertheless, there has been much controversy over the years with respect to the proper
calculation of damages upon exercise of a stock option. The Steinberg case early held that, in
matching the acquisition of shares upon exercise of a call option with an insider's sale of the
same shares within six months, the measure of damages equals the difference between the sales
proceeds and the sum of the exercise price and the value of the option at the date of its
"accrual," i.e., the date upon which it became exercisable by the insider. Steinberg v. Sharpe,
95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Because it was believed that this measure of damages unfairly deprived an insider of the
increase in the value of his option from the date of acquisition until the date of exercise where
those dates were separated by more than six months, see 1960 YALE Comment, supra note 114, at
880-81, the SEC promulgated Rule 16b-6, which limits the profit recoverable from an insider
who exercises a stock option acquired more than six months before its exercise to the differ-
ence between the proceeds of the sale and the lowest market price of any security of the same
class within six months before or after the date of the sale. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(b) (1973).
The Rule limits profit recapture only with respect to "that number of shares covered by the
option." See Capital Transamerica Corp., 1973 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available September
20, 1973) (interpretative letter by the SEC staff). It was originally suggested that the Com-
mission might have exceeded its authority under § 16(b) in promulgating Rule 16b-6 because
the Rule is designed only to limit damages, rather than to exempt a particular transaction from
the insider trading recapture provision. See Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir.
1952). However, the constitutionality of Rule 16b-6 has been upheld. Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217
F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1964). See 2 Loss supra note 3,
at 1081-82; 5 Loss 3046 (Supp. 1969).
Nevertheless, the Steinberg measure of damages still has vitality in certain situations
because Rule 16b-6 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be deemed to enlarge
the amount of profit which would inure to the issuer in the absence of this section." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16b-6(b) (1973). Thus, a recent decision made no reference to Rule 16b-6 in holding
that an insider was not liable for damages under § 16(b) where the price on the date the
option was first exercisable exceeded the price realized on a cash sale of the underlying securities
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The import of Kern and Bershad is that an insider's grant of an option may
under some circumstances be deemed a sale of the shares subject to the option
under Section 16(b). Hence, the two tests enunciated by the Supreme Court are
directly applicable only if there has been a subsequent exercise of the option
effecting a disposition of shares which may be related back for Section 16(b)
purposes to the date of grant and matched with a second transaction in the
underlying securities, within six months of the grant. However, the Supreme
Court's explicit adoption of a flexible philosophy in dealing with "extraordinary"
Section 16(b) transactions may suggest that the "speculative abuse" standard
may be applicable to insider option transactions related to bids for corporate
control even where there has been no exercise of an option. For example, if a
prospective acquiring corporation purchased a call option for a large block of
the shares of the issuer and then determined to permit the option to lapse, it
would be incongruous to characterize the acquisition of the option as a Section
16(b) "purchase" of the underlying shares. Because the insider's position in
the underlying securities of the issuer was not altered by reason of the acquisition
of the option, it is difficult to understand how a court could find that the pros-
pective acquirer had the opportunity to abuse its inside position.' " Further-
more, even if the possibility of speculative abuse could be shown, a plaintiff who
sought to match the insider's transaction in the option with a transaction in the
underlying shares would be faced with the difficult question of computing the
profit from short-swing transactions in two different securities. Nevertheless, the
courts have shown a predilection to squeeze all potential insider profits out of
within six months of exercise. Levy v. Seaton, 358 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
There is presently some uncertainty with respect to which six-month period is relevant
under Rule 16b-6 for the purpose of computing damages. Morales v. Walt Disney Products.
361 F.Supp. 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), recently held that the appropriate period for assessing the
purchase price of the shares subject to option is the six-month period ending at midnight on the
date of the sale. It has been suggested, however, that some courts have utilized an improper
"alternative matching" procedure, whereby the court would choose any six-month period
which maximized profits. Such period would extend from a date six months before the first
transaction to a date six months after the second transaction, thus providing a choice in some
cases of eighteen months duration. It has been urged that the Rule only allows, in contrast,
for a "single matching" method of looking at the six-month period prior or subsequent to the
date of sale. See Palmer, Computing Section 16(b) Profits on Stock Bought Under Option:
Applying Rule 16b-6, 25 Bus. LAW. 1269 (1970). This view accords with the statement in the
Rule that the purchase price of the shares subject to option is "the lowest market price of any
security of the same class within six months before or after the date of sale." 17 C.F.R. §
240.16b-6 (b).
Rule 16b-6 has been criticized on the ground that the purchase price it mandates may be
as arbitrary as the "date of accrual" test it was designed to replace. See 1960 YALE Com-
ment, supra note 114, at 878-83; Selas v. Voogd, CCH CURRENT FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 94,374,
at 95,294 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1973) (defendant argued unsuccessfully that Rule 16b-6 should
be deemed inapplicable and that the court should undertake "an equitable inquiry into the
extent to which [the defendant's exercised] option constituted compensation, and as such would
not be considered a profit under § 16(b)"). It has been proposed that the date of accrual of a
stock option ought to be deemed the date of "purchase" where the receipt of an option is fol-
lowed by exercise and a sale of shares more than six months after accrual; conversely, the date
of exercise would be deemed the date of "purchase" where a sale of the underlying securities was
followed by receipt of the option. See Hardee, Stock Options and the "Insider Trading" Pro-
visions of the Securities Exchange Act, 65 HAv. L. Rlv. 997, 1008 (1952).
149 It should be noted, however, that the insider's acquisition of an option for a controlling
block of shares which is subsequently permitted to lapse might be evidence of the opportunity
for speculative abuse with respect to another extraordinary transaction-e.g., the corporate
reorganization in Newmark. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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Section 16(b) transactions regardless of the absence of actual financial gain."'
Thus, if a court found that the acquisition of an option which is not subsequently
exercised presented the opportunity for speculative abuse, it is not inconceivable
that, in order to arrive at a measure of recoverable profits, it might assign a price
to the shares subject to the option (perhaps the higest price from the time the
option became exercisable until its expiration date) and match that price with
the price actually realized in the insider's cash transaction in the underlying
securities.
3. The Relevant Period of Inquiry Under Kern
While the Supreme Court did not expressly consider the relevant period for
examining the potential for abuse of inside information with respect to the option
transaction in Kern, its treatment of the grant and exercise of the Occidental-
Tenneco option suggests certain tentative conclusions. The Court examined
Occidental's access to inside information subsequent to the tender offer purchases
which made it a statutory insider and prior to the grant of the call option. This
approach is consistent with the Gold dissent's view that the relevant period under
Kern is the period beween the two matched transactions. 51
The appropriate period is more difficult to determine where an insider's
option acquisition (or grant) is the first of two matched transactions. This situa-
tion would occur where the only transaction which could be matched with the
insider's acquisition of a call option is a cash sale of the underlying shares which
was effected within six months after such acquisition. 5 ' In such case, it seems
that the insider's potential to obtain access to inside information after the "ex-
traordinary" transaction-the period urged by the dissent in Gold-should be
relevant in characterizing the option agreement as a "purchase" or "sale." How-
ever, the analysis undertaken by the Gold majority should not be disregarded
because Kern stressed Occidental's lack of inside information during the negotia-
tions culminating in the grant of the option. Furthermore, an examination of an
insider's position prior to the option transaction typically should not pose the
theoretical difficulties which arise in the reorganization area because there is
only one relevant issuer both before and after the option transaction. 5 '
Where the option transaction is the first of the matched transactions, addi-
150 For example, Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951), employed the Smolowe "lowest purchase price-highest sales price" test, see note
50 supra, to impose liability upon an insider for over $300,000 although the insider had
realized a net loss of over $400,000 on all his cash transactions in the issuer's shares during the
relevant six-month period. Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An
Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L. Q. 69,
83 (1966).
151 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
152 The same situation would occur if (1) the insider's acquisition of a put could be matched
only with a subsequent purchase of the underlying shares, or (2) the insider's grant of a call
could be matched only with a subsequent purchase of the underlying shares, or (3) the in-
sider's grant of a put could be matched only with a subsequent sale of the underlying shares.
However, because the considerations are the same in each case and for the purpose of clarity,
this analysis of the appropriate period for assessing the potential for speculative abuse deals
solely with the insider-grantee of a call.
153 See text accompanying notes 82 to 94 supra.
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tional refinements of the appropriate period may be required. If the exercise of
the option precedes the second transaction sought to be matched with the option
acquisition, the exercise, as well as the grant, would necessarily have occurred
within six months of the second transaction. The Kern speculative abuse analysis
would be unnecessary in this situation because the plaintiff could match two cash
transactions (the exercise of the option with the cash purchase or sale). This is
analogous to the sequence of transactions posed in Newmark. If the date of exer-
cise of the option follows the cash purchase or sale, two cash transactions may
still be matched so long as the exercise did not occur more than six months after
the other cash transaction, regardless of the date of the option's grant. How-
ever, if the exercise of the option occurs more than six months after both the
option acquisition and an intervening cash purchase or sale, the typical Kern
analysis is presented: whether the exercise of the option for cash should be related
back to the date of its acquisition. Kern is directly relevant to this question
because Tenneco's exercise of the Occidental option occurred more than six
months from both the date of grant and the tender offer purchases of the Kern
shares, which occurred prior to the grant. The Court noted that the Occidental-
Tenneco option was not and, under the terms of the option agreement, could not
be exercised until six months after the grant. This suggested that Occidental had
no potential to indulge in speculative abuse, because whatever inside information
it had at the date of grant was presumed, under the statute, to be dissipated by the
date of exercise." 4 However, the length of the period between the grant and
exercise of the option does not in itself appear to have been determinative, because
the Court deemed it necessary to cite other indicia of Occidental's lack of access
to inside infornation.155 In addition, where the option transaction is followed by
a cash purchase or sale, there is an additional period, not available in Kern,
during which the possibility of speculative abuse could be found-the period
between the option acquisition and the first of the two cash transactions.
Finally, the Bershad test of transfer of ownership of the shares subject to the
option seems applicable regardless of the date of exercise. Indeed, the Court
would have assessed Section 16(b) liability in Kern, where the exercise occurred
more than six months after the grant, if it had found that Occidental had
relinquished the emoluments of ownership of the Tenneco shares by virtue of its
grant of the call option.
154 411 U.S. at 603. The presence or absence of a six-month period between the acquisition
(or grant) of an option and its exercise has figured heavily in proposals for exempting certain
insider option transactions from the operation of § 16(b). For example, it has been urged
that an insider's issuance of a put or call whose exercisability will not expire for less than
six months should not be deemed a "purchase" or "sale" for § 16(b) purposes, because the
possibility of exercise outside the statutory six-month period of presumed inside information
precludes the possible use of the option by the insider as a mechanism for speculative abuse.
See 1972 GEORGIA. Note, supra note 119, at 172. In a similar vein, it has been suggested that
an insider-grantee's exercise of "long-term" options, e.g., options whose expiration is six months
or more from the date of exercise, should not be deemed a § 16(b) "purchase" or "sale"
because "the need to exercise the options and hold the option stock in order to realize gain
from an anticipated rise during the short-swing period" could not have prompted the insider's
exercise. See Laufer, supra note 120, at 248.
155 See text accompanying note 133 supra.
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B. Employee Stock Options
The acquisition by insiders of employee stock options pursuant to tax-qualified
and non-qualified stock option plans and employee stock purchase plans poses a
series of considerations distinct from those presented by the grant and exercise
of put and call options in corporate reorganizations. While the grant or acquisi-
tion of private puts and calls appears to benefit only the insider who is a pros-
pective acquirer, employee stock option plans serve legitimate, generally acknowl-
edged corporate purposes. Moreover, the treatment of employee stock options
under the Exchange Act is governed in part by rules promulgated by the SEC,
which have given rise to certain interpretative problems not present in the ap-
plication of Section 16(b) to put and call options.
1. The Acquisition of Employee Options Under Rule 16b-3
Section 16(b) treatment of the acquisition by insiders of employee stock
options pursuant to qualified stock option and employee stock purchase plans
qualifying for favorable federal income tax treatment and of restricted stock op-
tions (which generally qualify for highly favorable income tax treatment if
granted before January 1, 1964)... has largely been settled by SEC Rule 16b-3,
the prefatory clause of which provides that
156 The three types of plans have many similar features, in part because they must meet
many of the same requirements to qualify for favorable Federal tax treatment. See INT. Rav.
CODE OF 1954 §§ 421-25. Their features relevant for § 16(b) purposes are the following:
Under the plans an employee is granted an option to purchase a specified number of the
corporation's shares. The minimum purchase price is determined under specific rules that are
different for each type of plan. The exercise price of qualified stock options must be not less
than 100% of the fair market value of the shares subject to option at the date of grant, while
the exercise price of employee stock purchase plan options must be not less than the lower of
85% of the fair market value of the shares at the date of grant or 85% of the fair market value
at the date of exercise. Restricted stock options ordinarily must have an exercise price not less
than 85% of the fair market value at the date of grant. However, restricted stock options are
of little importance today because they qualify for favorable tax treatment only if granted on or
before December 31, 1963, unless such options are granted thereafter pursuant to a binding
written contract entered into, or a written plan adopted and approved by the shareholders, be-
fore January 1, 1964 which must meet other stringent requirements. Id. § 424(c) (3).
Under the prior law restricted stock option plans did not require shareholder approval to
qualify for favorable tax treatment, although shareholder was frequently sought for corporate
reasons. In contrast, certain aspects of qualified stock option plans and employee stock purchase
plans (e.g., the number of shares available for the plan) must be shareholder-approved.
Id. §§ 422(b) (1), 423(b) (2). Stock option and stock purchase plans may also differ in the
type of eligible recipients of the options and in the manner and periods of the exercise of the
options and payment for the underlying shares. The recipients of qualified or restricted stock
options may be limited for tax purposes to officers and other key employees of the corporation.
In contrast,. the Internal Revenue Code requires that employee stock purchase plan option
must be made available to all employees of the corporation, except that the corporation, in its
discretion, may exclude certain specified classes of employees, including those who do not work
full time or throughout the year and "officers, persons whose principal duties consist of super-
vising the work of other employees, or highly compensated employees . . . ." Id. § 423-
(b) (4) (D). Moreover, under the terms of a tax-qualified employee stock purchase plan, all
employees granted options to purchase shares must have the "same rights and privileges,"
except that the number of shares allocated under such options may bear a uniform relationship
to an employee's total compensation. Id. § 423 (b)'(5).
Restricted stock options may be exercisable for a maximum of ten years from the date of
grant. Qualified stock options may be exercisable for a maximum of five years from the date of
grant. Employee stock purchase plan options may be exercisable for a maximum of 27 months
from the date of grant unless the option price is to be not less than 85% of the fair market
value of the shares at the date of exercise, in which case such options may be exercisable for
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[a]ny acquisition of shares of stock (other than stock acquired upon the
exercise of an option, warrant or right) pursuant to a stock bonus, profit
sharing, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings or similar plan, or any acqui-
sition of a qualified or a restricted stock option pursuant to a qualified or
restricted stock option plan, or of a stock option pursuant to an employee
stock purchase plan, by a director or officer of the issuer of such stock or
stock option shall be exempt from the operation of Section 16(b) of the Act
if the plan meets [the conditions further specified in the Rule]. 15 7
Paragraph (d) of the Rule incorporates by reference the Internal Revenue
Code's definitions of qualified stock option plan, employee stock purchase plan,
and restricted stock option plan (with the exception that the Rule deems an
option to be a restricted stock option even if granted after the Code's cut-off date
for favorable tax treatment)?58
However, there are several interpretative problems with respect to the con-
ditions for qualifying for the Rule 16b-3 exemption which are unrelated to the re-
quirements for favorable tax treatment. These interpretative problems have been
accentuated by the paucity of consistent administrative interpretations of the
Rule's requirements. Two problem areas have arisen under paragraph (a) of
Rule 16b-3, which provides that an option acquired by an insider pursuant to a
qualified or restricted stock option plan or an employee stock purchase plan may
qualify for the exemption provided by the Rule only if the plan "has been ap-
proved, directly or indirectly" by a majority of the shareholders of the corpora-
tion." 9 Paragraph (a) does not specify whether the board of directors of a
Eve years. Under any of the plans, the corporation may grant the employees the discretion to,
elect when to exercise their options until the date of expiration. It should be noted, however,
that such discretion may be severely limited by the terms of the option (e.g., the
corporation may require the optionee to purchase at least 15% of the shares subject to option
within 90 days of the date of grant to prevent the option from lapsing). Under certain
employee stock purchase plans, the manner of exercise and payment of the purchase price may
be fixed under the plan so that the scope of employee discretion is even further limited. The
recipients of options under such plans elect at the date of the offering to have a percentage
of their regular compensation, up to a specified maximum, withheld by the corporation. Having
elected to participate in the employee stock purchase plan, the employee may have no dis-
cretion to determine when the options will be exercised. Instead, the plan may contain a
formula which provides that the corporation will utilize the accumulated employee funds to
purchase shares in the name of the employee at specified dates, provided that there are funds
sufficient to purchase a specified number of whole shares of the corporation's common stock.
If the employee chooses a high enough withholding percentage, the corporation might thus
purchase shares of stock in his name regularly (perhaps as frequently as monthly). The only
discretion remaining in the employee may be terminating completely his participating in the
offering (in which case the employee would be permitted to withdraw any uninvested funds
accumulated before an investment date), increasing or decreasing his withholding percentage,
or, under some plans, reducing the withholding percentage to zero for an indefinite period.
157 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 "(1973) (emphasis supplied).
158 See id. § 240.16b-3 (d) (2). The SEC staff has indicated that it will express no opinion
with respect to whether a plan meets the Internal Revenue Code's definitions of qualified or
restricted stock option plan or employee stock purchase plan, see note 156 supra, which are in-
corporated into Rule 16b-3. Such a determination must be made by the issuer itself. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1971 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available May 21, 1971) (inter-
pretative letter).
159 Paragraph (a) of Rule 16b-3 provides:
The plan has been approved, directly or indirectly, (1) by the affirmative votes
of the holders of a majoiity of the securities of the issuer present, or represented,
and entitled to vote at a meeting duly held in accordance with the applicable laws
of the state or other jurisdiction in which the issuer was incorporated, or (2) by the
written consent of the holders of a majority of the securities of the issuer entitled to
vote: Provided, however, That if such vote or written consent was not solicited sub-
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corporation may adopt a qualified or restricted stock option plan or employee
stock purchase plan and issue options qualifying for the Rule 16b-3 exemption
if shareholder approval is obtained at a subsequent shareholder meeting. It is
arguable, in the absence of authority, 60 that the words "has been approved" in
paragraph (a) suggest that retroactive approval of the directors' action is pre-
cluded. However, it is believed that retroactive shareholder approval should be
sufficient to qualify the options for the Rule 16b-3 exemption. Because it is gen-
erally impractical for publicly held corporations to solicit shareholder approval
more frequently than annually, a requirement of prior shareholder approval
would deprive the board of directors of the necessary flexibility to adopt an option
plan qualifying under the Rule in a timely fashion if it deems such a plan in the
best interests of the corporation (eg., as an incentive necessary to attract a key
executive). Moreover, an analogy may properly be drawn to the carefully cir-
cumscribed provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, which are expressly in-
corporated by reference in Rule 16b-3 and which permit shareholder approval
to be obtained up to 12 months after the date of adoption by the board of direc-
tors of an option plan for the purpose of qualifying for favorable tax treat-
ment."6' Furthermore, since the board may provide that options granted pursuant
to a plan may not be exercised until shareholder approval has been obtained, it
does not appear that the shareholders of the corporation could be harmed through
the mere grant of the options under the plan, the effectiveness of which is subject
to such shareholder approval.
Another problem arising under Rule 16b-3 (a) is that it has not yet been
established whether shareholder approval of a qualified or restricted stock option
plan or employee stock purchase plan vesting the board of directors with broad
rights to amend, modify or terminate the plan might be deemed to violate the
stantially in accordance with the rules and regulations, if any, in effect under Section
14(a) of the Act at the time of such vote or written consent, the issuer shall furnish
in writing to the holders of record of the securities entitled to vote for the plan sub-
stantially the same information concerning the plan which would be required by the
rules and regulations in effect under Section 14(a) of the Act at the time such infor-
mation is furnished, if proxies to be voted with respect to the approval or disapproval
of the plan were then being solicited, on or prior to the date of the first annual meet-
ing of security holders held subsequent to the later of (i) the first registration of an
equity security under Section 12 of the Act, or (ii) the acquisition of an equity
security for which exemption is claimed. Such written information may be furnished
by mail to the last known address of the security holders of record within 30 days
prior to the date of mailing. Four copies of such written information shall be filed
with, or mailed for filing to, the Commission not later than the date on which it is
first sent or given to security holders of the issuer. For the purposes of this para-
graph, the term "issuer" includes a predecessor corporation if the plan or obligations
to participate thereunder were assumed by the issuer in connection with the succession.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(a) (1973).
160 "No-action" letters issued by the SEC staff have expressly indicated that Rule 16b-3
is applicable to otherwise qualifying plans which have already received shareholder approval
at an annual meeting, Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., 1973 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (avail-
able August 13, 1973), or will receive shareholder approval at a subsequent annual meeting
prior to the issuance of options. First Pennsylvania Corp., 1973 WASH. SERv. BUR. INDEX
(available March 26, 1973). However, the staff has not yet commented upon the availability
of Rule 16b-3 to options granted prior to shareholder approval.
The staff has noted in one interpretative letter that Rule 16b-3 may be available to an
otherwise qualifying stock option plan where the shareholders had not expressly approved the
plan but had voted in favor of a merger at an annual meeting after receipt of a proxy state-
ment which made it clear that approval of the merger constituted approval of the plan.
Southern Natural Gas Co., 1973 WASH. SERv. BUR. INDEX *(available June 11, 1973).
161 See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 §§ 422(b) (1), 423 (b)'(2) ; note 156 supra.
[April 1974]
[Vol. 49:705] SECTION 16(b) AND "EXTRAORDINARY" TRANSACTIONS 745
requirement under paragraph (a) that the effective terms of a qualifying plan
be approved by the shareholders themselves. Recent SEC "no action" and
interpretative letters are inconclusive in this respect. On the one hand, in
Cypress Mines Corp., the Commission accorded a Rule 16b-3 exemption to an
otherwise qualifying plan which contained a provision vesting broad amendatory
discretion in the board of directors."6 2 However, in Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc.,
the Commission denied a Rule 16b-3 exemption merely because the registration
statement filed with the plan
states that the plan may be terminated, modified or amended by the Com-
pany's Board of Directors as well as -by its shareholders. On the basis of
the facts presented, this division is not able to concur in your opinion that
the receipt of the options granted pursuant to the Plan need not be re-
ported.1 63
Since the position of the Commission on the amendment issue is unclear, it is
submitted that the SEC should view stock option plans from the standpoint of
the potential for speculative abuse, focusing on the substance of a particular
amendment rather than upon the language in the plan setting forth the amend-
ment power. Since it is often impractical for the board of directors to solicit
shareholder approval for minor amendments to a plan, shareholders should be
deemed to have ratified in advance any modification by the board which they
could reasonably have contemplated in approving the plan, including its amend-
ment powers. Whereas the board should not be able to change the significant
substantive terms of the plan (e.g., the number of shares, price, or formula of
exercisability) without shareholder approval, other revisions which do not distort
the purposes of the plan adopted by the shareholders should not be deemed
to violate paragraph (a) of the Rule."e
162 The plan provided:
The Company reserves the right, by action of the Board, to amend, suspend or termi-
nate this Plan. No amendment, suspension or termination of this Plan shall have any
retroactive effect except when such an effect shall be beneficial to the employees or in
the opinion of the Company is necessary or advisable in order to comply with the
provisions of Federal or State laws, or any rulings or regulations issued thereunder,
pertaining to employee benefit plans and trusts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no
.amendment, suspension or termination shall have the effect of providing that the
assets held in trust by the Trustee or the income therefrom may be used for or devoted
to purposes other than those provided for in this Plan. Upon a complete discon-
tinuance of Company Contributions, contributions of Employee Savings will cease
and this Plan will be terminated.
Cypress Mines Corp., 1972 WASH. SERv. BUR. INDEX (available March 17, 1972).
163 Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 1972 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available September 19,
1972). The denial of the exemption is particularly troublesome because counsel had not even
raised the amendment issue in its inquiry to the SEC staff.
164 The SEC staff has in fact looked to the substance of a particular amendment of an
otherwise qualifying plan, rather than to the scope of amendment power accorded to the board,
in the few other interpretative letters relevant to the amendment question. See Cleveland Elec.
Illumination -Co., 1973 WASH. SERv. BUR. INDEX (available May 7, 1973) (indicating that
the staff would recommend no action if the board, without further shareholder action, amended
a qualifying profit sharing plan to comply with recent IRS rulings by (1) defining the minimum
required employee contribution on the basis of a percentage of compensation rather than a
dollar amount and (2) limiting an employee's previously unrestricted right to withdraw contri-
buted funds for educational purposes without forfeiting the employer's contributions, where the
basic provisions of the plan were not to be expanded); Pfizer, Inc., 1972 WASH. SERv. BuR.
Imx (available June 29, 1972) (an otherwise qualifying plan would continue to meet Rule
16b-3's requirements upon being amended to include provisions permitting the grant of non-
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Other interpretative problems have arisen under paragraph (b) of the Rule,
which provides that if "the selection of any director or officer" to whom stock
options may be granted or "the determination of the number or maximum
number of shares of stock... which may be covered" by such options granted
pursuant to the plan is subject to the discretion of any person, such discretion
can generally be exercised only by a committee of "disinterested" persons. 
1 5
qualified as well as qualified stock options and to increase the number of shares available for
purchase under the plan). For an analysis of the treatment of plans providing for the extension
of both tax-qualified and non-qualified employee stock options, see text accompanying note 171
& note 171 infra.
165 Paragraph (b) of Rule 16b-3 provides:
(b) If the selection of any director or officer of the issuer to whom stock may be
allocated or to whom qualified, restricted or employee stock purchase plan stock
options may be granted pursuant to the plan, or the determination of the number or
maximum number of shares of stock which may be allocated to any such director or
officer or which may be covered by qualified, restricted or employee stock purchase
plan stock options granted to any such director or officer, is subject to the discretion
of any person, then such discretion shall be exercised only as follows:
(I) With respect to the participation of directors-
(i) by the board of directors of the issuer, a majority of which board and a
majority of the directors acting in the matter are disinterested persons;
(ii) by, or only in accordance with the recommendation of, a committee of three
or more persons having full authority to act in the matter, all of the members of
which committee are disinterested persons; or
(iii) otherwise in accordance with the plan, if the plan (a) specifies the number or
maximum number of shares of stock which directors may acquire or which may be
subject to qualified, restricted or employee stock purchase plan stock options granted
to directors and the terms upon which, and the times at which, or the periods within
which, such stock may be acquired or such options may be acquired and exercised;
or (b) sets forth, by formula or otherwise, effective and determinable limitations with
respect to the foregoing based upon earnings of the issuer, dividends paid, compensa-
tion received by participants, option prices, market value of shares, outstanding shares
or percentages thereof outstanding from time to time, or similar factors.
(2) With respect to the participation of officers who are not directors-
(i) by the board of directors of the issuer or a committee of three or more
directors; or
(ii) by, or only in accordance with the recommendations of, a committee of three
or more persons having full authority to act in the matter, all of the members of
which committee are disinterested persons.
A committee member is deemed "disinterested" only if he
is not at the time such discretion is exercised eligible and has not at any time within
one year prior thereto been eligible for selection as a person to whom stock may be
allocated or to whom qualified, restricted or employee stock purchase plan stock
options may be granted pursuant to the plan or any other plan of the issuer or any
of its affiliates entitling the participant therein to acquire stock or qualified, restricted
or employee stock purchase plan stock options of the issuer or any of its affiliates.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(b) (1973).
The SEC staff has been strict in its interpretation of the Rule's requirement that a "dis-
interested" person may not be (or have been during the previous year) "eligible for selection
as a person to whom stock may be allocated or to whom qualified, restricted or employee
stock purchase plan options may be granted pursuant to . . . any other plan of the issuer or
any of its affiliates ... ." Id. (emphasis supplied). Thus, where a company had a stock option
plan and an employee stock purchase plan otherwise qualifying under Rule 16b-3, the members
of the committee appointed to administer the stock option plan were deemed not to be "dis-
interested" persons because they were eligible to participate in the stock purchase plan. R.B.
Jones Corp., 1972 WA'SH. SERv. BUR. INDEX (available August 25, 1972). However, because
the definition of "disinterested" person refers only to eligibility under the tax-qualified employee
compensation plans (i.e., qualified or restricted stock option plans and employee stock purchase
plans) as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, it appears that a person will be deemed "dis-
interested" if he is (or has been during the previous year) eligible to receive stock or options
only under non-tax qualified plans (e.g., an employee stock option plan in which the purchase
price of the underlying shares is fixed below 85% of the market price at the date of grant).
The proviso in subparagraph (b) (1) (iii) that, in the case only of directors, the discretion
is deemed to be exercised in accordance with paragraph (b)'s requirements if the plan itself
either specifies the number or maximum number of shares which the director may acquire
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Certain plans are administered on a day-to-day basis by either an officer or
director designated as an administrator or by an independent trustee (e.g., a bank
or trust company). While the Rule does not appear to preclude an administrator
from being interested in the plan, the language of paragraph (b) fails to establish
whether certain powers may be exercised by the administrator without the ap-
proval of the disinterested committee s' For example, it is currently unclear
whether paragraph (b) would be violated if an administrator were granted the
power under the plan to include or exclude directors or officers as a class without
the prior approval of a disinterested committee. It is arguable that the words
"the selection" in paragraph (b) refer only to the inclusion of directors and
officers, so that an administrator's exclusion of all insiders would not have to be
approved by the committee. But it may be urged that even a power to include
insiders as a class could be exercised without committee approval on the ground
that the language "any director or officer" limits paragraph (b)'s scope to the
selection of individual directors or officers. 167
Moreover, it is conceivable that the administrator's power under certain
plans to "construe the rights of all employees under each offering" and to "de-
termine the total number of shares subject to each offering" might be interpreted
as a form of discretion to determine "the number or maximum number of shares
of stock... which may be covered" by options granted to officers and directors,
which may not be exercised under paragraph (b) unless approved by the dis-
interested committee. However, it is submitted that paragraph (b) should not
be deemed to have been violated unless the administrator has the additional
power to modify the allocation among the various individual officer or director
insiders after the total number of shares in the offering is established.
Paragraph (b) also does not state whether a qualifying plan must explicitly
restrict the power of the board of directors to amend the plan to eliminate the
committee of distinterested persons or to authorize the appointment to the com-
mittee of a person who is not a "disinterested" person within the meaning of the
Rule. Nevertheless, the Commission has apparently taken the position that para-
graph (b) will not be violated unless the board affirmatively amends the plan
pursuant to the plan and the time periods of exercise or sets forth "effective and determinable
limitations" establishing such a maximum number of shares and the periods of exercise may be
of little benefit to issuers as many plans make officers eligible as well as directors.
166 The SEC staff has indicated that a plan will not be deemed to vest employees with
discretion violating Rule 16b-3 (b) if they are given the power to determine whether 2%, 4%
or 6% of compensation will be withheld and invested in the company's common shares, even
where such a determination fixes the size of the employer's matching contribution. Amerada
Hess Corp., 1972 WASH. SEav. BUR. I DEx (available May 1, 1972) (employee savings and
stock bonus plan). See also Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 1973 WASm. SERv. BuR. INDEX
(available July 30, 1973) (SEC staff reaffirming its view in Amerada Hess Corp. that Rule
16b-3 (b) (2) was not intended to destroy the availability of the Rule 16b-3 exemption to plans
having provisions allowing participating employees to make determinations of the type specified
therein).
167 There is an additional ground for finding that an administrative power to include in-
siders in an employee stock purchase plan could not lead to speculative abuse. Since partici-
pation in an employee stock purchase plan must typically be open to all full-time employees
to qualify for favorable tax treatment, see note 156 supra, the inclusion of insiders would at
best put them on a parity with other employees.
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expressly to allow persons interested therein to serve on the committee.'6s
Finally, the Commission has not clarified to date whether the phrase "in
accordance with the recommendation of a committee of three or more [dis-
interested] persons" in paragraph (b) permits majority action or requires unan-
imous action by the committee where the committee consists of the mininum
three persons. It is submitted that because the Rule speaks in terms of the recom-
mendation of the committee as a governing body, rather than the unanimous
recommendation of its three individual members, approval by a committee
majority of the exercise of administrative discretion with respect to officers and
directors should satisfy paragraph (b).
The requirement of paragraph (c) of Rule 16b-3 that any qualified or
restricted stock option plan or employee stock purchase plan must effectively
limit the aggregate dollar amount or the aggregate number of shares of stock
which may be allocated or which may be subject to options granted to all par-
ticipants pursuant to the plan gives rise to an additional interpretative problem
under the Rule. Because paragraph (c) specifically provides that such limita-
tions "may be established on an annual basis, or for the duration of the plan,
whether or not the plan has a fixed termination date," ' 9 it is possible that a plan
may be required explicitly to provide that the shareholders may not amend the
plan more frequently than annually to vary the aggregate dollar amount or the
aggregate number of shares of stock to qualify for the Rule's exemption. In view
of the fact that the shareholders could avoid that requirement simply by creating
a new plan, the presence of such a power to amend probably should not be
deemed to exceed the requirements of paragraph (c) if the plan otherwise limits
the aggregate dollar amount and the aggregate number of shares of stock which
may be allocated to participants.
2. Acquisition of Non-exempt Employee Options
The Rule 16b-3 exemption may be unavailable for an insider's acquisition
168 See Norton Simon, Inc.. 1971 WAsH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available April 16, 1971).
The SEC staff reply noted:
The plan does not limit participation to officers who are not directors. The admini-
strative committee is to consist of directors. Should officers who are also directors
be selected to participate, the plan would not be exempt. Furthermore, the plan
may be amended or modified at any time by the Board of Directors. Should those
provisions of the plan which govern membership on the administrative committee be
amended to permit interested persons to serve thereon any exemption theretofore in
existence would be defeated.
169 Paragraph (c) of Rule 16b-3 provides:
As to each participant or as to all participants the plan effectively limits the aggregate
dollar amount or the aggregate number of shares of stock which may be allocated,
or which may be subject to qualified, restricted, or employee stock purchase plan
stock options granted, pursuant to the plan. The limitations may be established on
an annual basis, or for the duration of the plan, whether or not the plan has a fixed
termination date; and may be determined either by fixed or maximum dollar amounts
or fixed or maximum numbers of shares or by formulas based upon earnings of the
issuer, dividends paid, compensation received by participants, option prices, market
value of shares, outstanding shares or percentages thereof outstanding from time to
time, or similar factors which will result in an effective and determinable limitation.
Such limitations may be subject to any provisions for adjustment of the plan or of
stock allocable or options outstanding thereunder to prevent dilution or enlargement
of rights.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(c) (1973).
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of employee stock options under tax qualified stock option plans and stock
purchase plans (meeting the Rule's definitional requirements) because such plans
may fail to meet one of the Rule's other conditions. In addition, issuers have
frequently elected to adopt non-qualified stock option plans ineligible for favorable
tax treatment, which are thus ineligible for the Rule 16b-3 exemption because
they fall to meet the Rule's definitional requirements. 70 Where an issuer adopts
a plan allowing for the extension of both qualified and non-qualified stock options
(under which, for tax reasons, any individual may be granted either qualified or
non-qualified options, but not both), it appears that those options which are
tax-qualified will also qualify for the Rule 16b-3 exemption so long as the plan
meets the other requirements of the Rule." "
The possibility of matching an insider's acquisition of a stock option granted
pursuant to a qualified or restricted stock option plan or employee stock purchase
plan with a subsequent sale of that option itself is precluded because such options
are made non-transferable (except by will or the laws of descent) in order to
qualify for favorable tax treatment."" In contrast, it is well established that an
insider's sale of transferable options acquired pursuant to a non-qualified stock
option plan, or of other transferable warrants or stock subscription rights, will
ordinarily give rise to Section 16(b) liability in the amount of the difference
between the sale proceeds and the value of the options on the date of their acqui-
sition, although the acquisition value may be difficult to determine if the options
are not actively traded. 7 3
170 The mere fact that the SEC has specifically exempted the acquisition of certain em-
ployee options from the operation of § 16(b) through Rule 16b-3 should not raise an inference
that the acquisition of non-exempt options is necessarily a "purchase." As noted earlier, the
SEC has no enforcement authority under § 16(b). See note 21 supra.
171 See Cypress Mines Corp., 1973 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available February 19,
1973) (interpretative letter by the SEC staff indicating that if all options granted under a
plan are restricted stock options except those granted to the company's controlling shareholder,
the fact that the controlling shareholder is not to receive the restricted stock options would
not in itself preclude the availability of Rules 16a-6 and 16b-3 as to other optionees). See also
Pfizer, Inc., 1972 WASH. SEnv. BUR. INDEX (available June 29, 1972) (staff interpretative
letter indicating that a stock option plan which previously satisfied the requirements of Rule
16b-3 continues to meet those requirements upon being amended to include provisions permit-
ting the grant of non-qualified as well as qualified stock options).
172 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 421-24. Nevertheless, there is a potential for matching
an insider's acquisition of a non-transferable option with his own grant or sale within six
months of a transferable call on the same securities of the corporation. It is hard to distinguish
such a transaction from ordinary insider trading in options. See text accompanying note 117
supra; note 173 infra.
173 In Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), where the plaintiff succeed-
ing in matching an insider's acquisition of transferable incentive warrants with his subsequent
sale of a portion of the warrants, the market price was readily obtainable. Judge Rifkind
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the cost of the warrants was zero and that the profit
recoverable from the insider should be the total price received by him upon disposition. He
held, rather, that the purchase price would equal the market value of the warrants at the
date of acquisition. (It should be noted that this is not necessarily the date of "accrual"
utilized by the Steinberg court to determine the purchase price of shares acquired upon exercise
of a stock option. See note 148 supra). Professor Loss approved of the Truncale test, noting
that "in the absence of an active market for the warrants on the date of their acquisition, the
solution which most readily suggests itself is simply to take the difference between the market
value of the stock called for and the exercise price." 2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1078.
However, the acquisition price of stock options is much more difficult to determine where
the options are not exercisable immediately upon acquisition. Loss suggests that in order to
maximize the profit recoverable from an insider "it is conceivable that under the Smolowe ap-
proach the courts will say that a 'purchase' occurs on each of several dates and will pick
whatever date maximizes the 'profit' in the particular case." Id. at 1079.
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A problem confronting insiders is the potential for matching the acquisition
of stock options failing to qualify for the Rule 16b-3 exemption with the insider's
sale of the underlying. securities within six months of such acquisition. 4 If the
insider's exercise of the employee option occurs within six months of the sale,
there would appear to be no difficulty in matching two cash transactions under
Section 16(b)." However, where only the date of grant, and not the date of
exercise, of the option falls within the relevant six-month period, Kern appears
to dictate the application of the same two tests utilized in analyzing option trans-
actions in corporate takeovers: whether the insider's acquisition of the employee
stock option was in effect a purchase of the shares subject to option and whether
the transaction could have lent itself to speculative abuse." 6
It appears that the acquisition of employee options could, under some
circumstances, amount to a purchase of the underlying shares in economic terms.
A non-qualified stock option, warrant, or other stock purchase right could
provide for such a low or nominal exercise price that a court would be justified in
finding that the underlying shares were in effect transferred to the optionee on the
date of grant. This possibility is precluded for tax-approved plans, however,
because the requirements for favorable tax treatment prevent the exercise price
of qualified stock options and of employee stock purchase plan options from being
established at less than 100% or 85%, respectively, of the market price.'
However, other factors suggest that the ownership of shares acquired pursuant
even to non-tax-qualified plans may not be transferred until the date of exercise of
the employee options. Employee stock option and purchase plans typically pro-
vide that an option holder has none of the rights incident to ownership of the
shares until the options are exercised. In addition, the fact that the employee
option holder typically pays no consideration for his options lessens the possibility
that it is economically unlikely for the insider not to exercise his option. 7'
174 See Wheat, Securities Regulation Aspects of Employee Stock Options Under the 1964
Revenue Act, 17 U.S.C. LAw TAX INST. 151, 183 '(1965); Kelley & Green, Application of
Section (16)b [sic] of the Securities and [sic) Exchange Act of 1934 to Insiders' Transactions
under Employee Stock Option Plans, 17 Bus. LAW. 402, 408 (1962).
175 See note 189 infra.
176 The tests of Kern are not directly applicable if an insider either had not yet exercised
the employee options or had permitted the options to lapse without exercise. See text accom-
panying note 149 supra.
177 See note 156 supra.
178 The SEC staff has not been confronted to date with the question of whether an insider's
acquisition of non-exempt employee stock options should be deemed a "purchase" of the shares
underlying the option. In Xerox Corp., 1973 WASH. SERv. BUR. INDEX (available May
7, 1973), the issuer's counsel argued that an insider's acquisition of "stock appreciation
rights" in connection with a qualified stock option plan meeting the requirements for exemp-
tion under Rule 16b-3 should not be deemed a "purchase" for the purposes of § 16 (b). Under
the terms of the qualified stock option plan, if an employee exercised a stock appreciation
right with respect to 100 shares under a related option having an exercise price of $100 per
share at a time when the fair market value of the share was $200, he would be entitled to
receive, without payment to the corporation, 50 shares of its common stock. To the extent
that the employee exercised the stock appreciation right, the number of shares covered by the
related option would be proportionately reduced. Because the SEC staff took the view that
a stock appreciation right is not sufficiently similar to a "stock bonus" to bring it within the
Rule 16b-3 exemption, see text accompanying note 157 supra, its reply stated that "it is the
view of this Division that the acquisition of a stock appreciation right in the manner specified
in your letter is a 'purchase' of an 'equity security' within the meaning and intent of Section
16b of the Securities Exchange Act." Curiously, however, the staff went on to note that "[w]e
express no opinion as to the applicability of Section 16(b) to such acquisition."
Very recently, in Mobile Oil Corp., COH CURRENT FED. Snc. L. R P. No. 526, 9 (available
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It appears that a court will be more inclined to find that an insider's acquisi-
tion of an employee option could have lent itself to "speculative abuse" than it
will in the case of the acquisition of an option in a corporate takeover context,
because the recipient of the employee option, as a member of the issuer's man-
agement, may be unable to rebut the presumption of access to inside informa-
tion.7'- However, other factors peculiar to employee stock option plans mitigate
against the finding of the possibility for speculative abuse. The motivation for the
corporation's grant and the insider's acquisition of the employee options-in-
creasing the insider's stake in and incentive on behalf of the corporation-does
not appear to "smack of" speculative abuse.' Nevertheless, a distinction must
be drawn between employee stock purchase plan options and options received
pursuant to qualified and non-qualified stock option plans. While the recipients
of employee stock purchase plan options have certain discretion with respect to
their participation in the plan, many do not have the power to time their exercise
of the options to maximize the spread between the exercise price and the market
price, because the date of exercise may be determined by a fixed formula estab-
lished under the plan on the date of grant. In contrast, the recipients of other
employee stock options typically have the discretion to elect when their options
will be exercised. Such a power to maximize profit could be deemed to present
the potential for speculative abuse which the statute was designed to prohibit-'
3. Rule 16a-6 Reporting Requirements
Beyond the question of whether or not an insider's acquisition of employee
stock options is deemed a "purchase" for the purposes of Section 16(b), there is
also some ambiguity with respect to the insider's reporting obligations under
February 7, 1974), the staff reversed its position and took the view that the acquisition of
stock appreciation rights is exempt under Rule 16b-3 when such rights are granted in tandem
under a single plan with employee stock options which qualify for the Rule's exemption. How-
ever, the staff did not indicate whether it had reconsidered its view expressed in Xerox that the
acquisition of non-exempt stock appreciation rights is a "purchase for the purposes of § 16 (b)."
The danger is that if the SEC staff continues to take the position that the acquisition of a
non-exempt stock acquisition right is a "purchase" for the purpose of § 16(b), it may also
take the position that the acquisition of a stock option under a tax-qualified plan failing to
meet the requirements of Rule 16b-3, or under any non-tax qualified plan, may also be deemed
a "purchase." However, in view of the reversal in Mobile Oil and the fact that the staff's
response in Xerox was drafted prior to the Kern decision, the force of this analogy is unclear.
It is possible that the acquisition of stock appreciation rights would be deemed a "purchase"
under Kern, and might be distinguishable from the acquisition of non-exempt employee stock
options, on the ground that stock appreciation rights practically transfer ownership of the under-
lying shares to the holder because shares are automatically transferred to the account of the
recipient without any investment on his part if the market value of the shares rises.
179 See text accompanying note 139 supra.
180 See Rubin & Feldman, supra note 117, at 487.
181 Only one decision has considered the question whether an insider's acquisition of em-
ployee options should be deemed a "purchase' under § 16(b). In Truncale v. Blumberg, 80
F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), which was not cited by the Supreme Court in Kern,
Judge Medina held that the disposition by way of gift of stock warrants acquired by a cor-
porate officer did not involve a "sale" within the meaning of § 16(b). He went on to state in
dictum that the original issuance of the incentive warrants to the officer pursuant to an em-
ployment contract did involve a "purchase" of the warrants under § 16(b).
Truncate appears to be of limited precedential value after Kern. As noted earlier, it
appears that Truncate would be followed in any case in which an insider has acquired trans-
ferable employee options or warrants and resold them for cash, because such a transaction is
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Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act."51 ' The proper reporting of the grant and
acquisition of options and other stock rights is now treated quite extensively in
SEC Rule 16a-6, paragraph (a) of which provides that
[t]he granting, acquisition or disposition of any presently exercisable put, call,
option or other right or obligation to buy securities from, or sell securities to,
another person, or any expiration or cancellation thereof, shall be deemed
to effect such a change in the beneficial ownership of the securities to which
indistinguishable from ordinary insider trading in options. Although the insider typically
would not pay cash for the options, the corporation's expectation of his continued employment
appears to be an adequate substitute for cash. However, Judge Medina's dictum should not
be taken to stand for the broad proposition that any acquisition by an officer or director of
stock options or warrants from a corporation involves a purchase within the meaning of §
16(b). In contrast, it appears that Kern effectively overruled Truncale's rather wooden ap-
proach to the "purchase" or "sale" issue where an "extraordinary" transaction is presented
(e.g., where the insider's acquisition of the employee options may be matched only with a
corresponding transaction in the underlying shares).
There is authority which affirmatively suggests that an insider's receipt of stock options
pursuant to an employee stock purchase plan is not a "purchase" for § 16(b) purposes. In
the only other case clearly dealing with an insider's receipt of stock subscription rights, Shaw
v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 '(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949), the Second Circuit
distinguished Truncale in holding that an insider's receipt of subscription rights on the same
basis as their receipt by other shareholders does not involve a "purchase" of the rights within
the meaning of § 16(b). '(The holding of the Shaw case has frequently been cited as standing
for the proposition that the receipt of a pro-rata stock dividend by an insider is not a § 16(b)
"purchase.") The reasoning of the Shaw majority was that where an insider is able to obtain
a stock dividend only upon the same terms and conditions as other shareholders, there is no
opportunity for the kind of manipulation and use of inside information that § 16(b) was
designed to eliminate. The Shaw decision thus appears to have employed the same type of
reasoning implicit in the speculative abuse test adopted by Kern. The majority's reasoning was
vigorously attacked in a dissent by Judge Clark, who believed that insiders could use their
advance knowledge of an impending grant of a stock dividend either to retain their own shares
or to acquire additional shares on a basis not available to other shareholders.
The reasoning of the Shaw majority seems applicable and Judge Clark's objection inap-
plicable to employee stock purchase plans. Just as shareholder officers and directors of the issuer
acquire no better rights than other shareholders through a pro-rata distribution of stock sub-
scription rights, insider officers and directors eligible to participate in an employee stock purchase
plan by definition may receive no more favorable treatment than other employees of the
corporation. See note 156 supra.
181.1 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970):
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted
security) which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or who is a director
or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration
statement filed pursuant to section 12(g) of this title, or within ten days after he
becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission
(and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the
exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the bene-
ficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall
also file with the exchange) a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the
calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such
calendar month.
Initial statements of beneficial ownership of equity securities required by § 16(a) must be
filed on SEC Form 3. Statements of changes in such beneficial ownership required by § 16(a)
must be filed on Form 4. SEC Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l '(1973). The instructions
provided for the completion of Form 4 require the reporting of every transaction effected by
a corporate insider "even though acquisitions and dispositions during the month are equal, or
the change involves only the nature of ownership, such as a change from indirect ownership
through a trust or corporation to direct ownership by the reporting person. SEC See. Ex. Act
Rel. No. 9500 (1972).
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the right or obligation relates as to require the filing of a statement [on SEC
Form 3 or Form 4] ... 12
It appears that an insider need not file a report with respect to his acquisition of
qualified or restricted stock options or employee stock purchase plan options
pursuant to a plan which meets the conditions specified in Rule 16b-3, because
paragraph (c) of Rule 16a-6 specifically exempts non-transferable options
qualifying for the Rule 16b-3 exemption from the reporting requirements under
Section 16 (a)."'83
However, an insider's obligation to file a report upon the acquisition of
employee stock options pursuant to a plan failing to qualify for the Rule 16b-3
exemption appears to rest on whether the options are as yet "presently exer-
cisable" within the meaning of paragraph (a) of Rule 16a-6. The SEC staff
has affirmed on several occasions that stock options received by insiders pur-
suant to a restricted or qualified stock option plan failing to meet the require-
ments of Rule 16b-3 must be reported under Rule 16a-6 immediately upon
receipt because such options typically are "presently exercisable.""' Nevertheless,
it is arguable that an insider's receipt of an option interest in an employee stock
purchase plan should not be reportable under Rule 16a-6 on the ground that
it is not "presently exercisable" since the option may not be exercised and shares
of stock may not be purchased until the end of an option period in which the
employee has accumulated sufficient funds to purchase a specified number of
whole shares. Under this view, employee stock purchase plan options would not
become "presently exercisable" before the last day on which the employee has the
opportunity to withdraw his funds, typically the last business day of the invest-
ment period."" Since the options would also be exercised on that day, it seems
182 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-6(a) (1973) (emphasis supplied). Under Rule 16a-6, "both the
grantor and the holder of a put, call, option or other right or obligation to buy or sell securities
are deemed to be beneficial owners of the securities subject to such right or obligation." SEC
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 9499 (1972).
Forms 3 and 4, as amended by the SEC in 1972, now provide a separate table for the
reporting of "puts, calls, options and other rights or obligations." See SEC Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
No. 9500 (1972).
183 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-6(c) '(1973).
184 See Faberge, Inc., 1972 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEX (available October 26, 1972)
(plan failed to meet Rule 16b-3's requirements because one or more of the three members of
the plan's administrative committee was not a "distinterested" person); R.B. Jones Corp.,
1972 WASH. SERV. BUR. INDEx (available August 25, 1972) (plan failed to qualify under
Rule 16b-3 because the members of the administrative committee were eligible to participate
in a second stock purchase plan of the issuer); Ralston Purina Co., 1971 WAsI. SERV. BUR.
INDEX (available October 26, 1971) '(plan failed to qualify under Rule 16b-3 because the
options granted pursuant thereto were neither qualified nor restricted stock options as'defined
in the Internal Revenue Code).
185 There appears to be some administrative support for this position by analogy to a
recent SEC no-action letter, Automatic Dividend Reinvestment Service, 1973 WASHE. SERv.
BUR. INDEx (available February 12, 1973). Pursuant to the terms of the Service, the First
National City Bank holds shares of stock on behalf of employees of various participating corpo-
rations. Approximately two days after quarter-annual dividends are received by the bank, the
bank commences to invest the dividends in additional shares purchased in the market. The
purchase of the shares is not completed until approximately 9 days after the initial receipt
of the dividend. After the acquisition is completed, the bank adjusts its records to reflect
the interest of all participating shareholders, and approximately 18 days after the initial receipt
of the dividend, it mails confirmations to such persons setting forth the number of additional
shares they have acquired and the price per share.
In response to the inquiry of the bank as to when an officer or director "acquires" stock
purchased through the Service for the purposes of § 16(b), the SEC staff noted:
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reasonable that only the acquisition of the underlying shares upon exercise of
the employee stock purchase plan options should have to be reported in a
Form 3 Report or a Form 4 Report filed for the period of exercise.""
4. Exercise of Employee Stock Options
Rule 16b-3 does not appear to exempt an insider's acquisition of shares of
stock upon exercise of qualified or restricted stock options or employee stock
purchase plan options from the operation of Section 16(b), because the pref-
atory dause to the Rule exempts stock acquired by a corporation's officers or
directors only if it is issued pursuant to a "stock bonus, profit sharing, retirement,
incentive, thrift, savings or similar plan" meeting the Rule's conditions.' In
contrast, the prefatory clause explicitly exempts only an insider's acquisition of
With respect to your question of when a reporting person is deemed to acquire a
beneficial interest through the Service, we feel that date should correspond to the
last day on which such participant is able to withdraw any uninvested cash held for
his account, and instead is entitled only to a distribution of whole shares which have
been or will be purchased for his account. We would not take any action if such
acquisitions are reported on a Form 4 which is filed within 10 days after the close of
the calendar month in which such participant receives a notification of securities
purchased for his account.
While an insider participating in the Automatic Dividend Reinvestment Service is not explic-
itly granted an option to purchase additional shares of stock, it appears that his ability to
withdraw the dividend credited to his account by the bank from the day it is received by the
bank until the day on which it is invested in additional shares of stock economically leaves
him with a type of right to purchase additional shares of stock. Thus the receipt by the bank
of the dividend probably should be deemed the acquisition by the insider of an "option or
other right" to buy securities from an issuer within the meaning of Rule 16a-6. But since
such "option or other right" is not acquired pursuant to a plan meeting the requirements of
Rule 16b-3, the timing of its reportability under Rule 16a-6 should not be different from that
of an employee's acquisition of an option interest pursuant to an employee stock purchase
plan which also fails to meet Rule 16b-3's requirements.
186 There is thus an additional ground for finding that an insider's acquisition of employee
stock purchase plan options should not be deemed a "purchase." Rule 16a-10 provides that
[a]ny transaction which has been or shall be exempted by the Commission from the
requirements of Section 16(a) shall, in so far as it is otherwise subject to the pro-
visions of Section 16(b), be likewise exempted from Section 16(b).
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1973). If an insider's acquisition of the options is not reportable
because the options are not "presently exercisable" until the underlying shares are acquired
upon exercise, it is arguable that the acquisition of the options is "exempted" from § 16(a)'s
reporting requirements by Rule 16a-6 and thus from potential Section 16(b) liability as a
"purchase" of the options by Rule 16a-10.
187 See, e.g., Potlatch Corp., CCH CURRENT FED. SEO. L. REP. 79,613 (available October
24, 1973) (interpretative letter of SEC staff indicating that the acquisition of the company's
shares by officers and directors pursuant to its salaried employees' savings investment plan ap-
pears to be exempted by Rule 16b-3); American Express Co., 1973 WAsH. SERv. BuR. INDEX
(available April 25, 1973) (interpretative letter indicating that the acquisition of the company's
shares by officers and directors pursuant to its incentive savings plan appears to be exempted
by Rule 16b-3); First Pennsylvania Corp., 1973 WASH. SERV. BuR. INDEX (available March
26, 1973) (interpretative letter indicating that the profit-sharing benefits received under the
company's deferred compensation plans are within the protection of Rule 16b-3). Such plans
are distinguishable from employee stock option and stock purchase plans because (1) employees
may acquire common shares of the company without making any cash investment, and (2)
such shares may be acquired directly without the extension of employee stock options.
It should be noted, however, that shares acquired pursuant to a "stock bonus, profit
sharing, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings or similar plan" must be reported pursuant to
4 16(a) despite the fact that their acquisition is specifically exempted from the operation of§ 16(b) by Rule 16b-3. See National Can Corp., 1972 WASH. SERv. BuR. INDEX (available
May 25, 1972) (interpretative letter indicating that beneficial interests acquired by insiders
in the company's profit sharing trust must be reported under- 16(a)).
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qualified or restricted stock options or employee stock purchase plan options
themselves if the plan meets the Rule's conditions. While Rule 16b-3 does not
explicitly state that shares received upon the exercise of an exempted option are
within the operation of Section 16(b), this may be inferred from the paren-
thetical phrase in the prefatory clause which denies the exemption to the ac-
quisition by officers and directors of shares of stock pursuant to even a "stock
bonus, profit sharing, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings or similar plan," in
which the acquisition of shares is ordinarily exempt, where such stock is acquired
"upon exercise of an option, warrant or right .... " It does not appear that
the SEC intended to give the acquisition of shares of stock pursuant to the
exercise of qualified stock options or employee stock purchase plan options more
favorable treatment.ls 9
Because employee stock options are already subject to extensive admin-
istrative regulation, the SEC would appear to have a special interest in resolv-
ing at least the more significant interpretative problems which have arisen under
Rules 16b-3 and 16a-6. While such clarification would probably be best effected
through a series of minor amendments to the rules governing options, the SEC
might also consider the desirability of publishing an interpretative release, which
could also deal with other option problems within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission (e.g., the reporting under Rule 16a-6 of non-transferable puts and calls
in the reorganization context).
188 See text accompanying note 157 supra. Paragraph (d)*(3) of Rule 16b-3 provides that
the phrase "exercise of an option, warrant or right" does not include
(i) the making of any election to receive under any plan compensation in the form
of stock or credits therefor provided that such election is made either prior to the
making of the award or prior to the fulfillment of all conditions to the receipt of the
compensation and, provided further, that such election is irrevocable until at least
6 months after termination of employment;
(ii) the subsequent crediting of such stock;
(ili) the making of any election as to the time for delivery of such stock after termi-
nation of employment, provided that such election is made at least 6 months prior
to any such delivery;
(iv) the fulfillment of any condition to the absolute right to receive such stock; or
(v) the acceptance of certificates for shares of such stock.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(3) (1973).
189 See Keller Industries, Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that the acquisition of shares upon exercise of an option, even though qualified or restricted
under the tax laws, is not exempted from the operation of § 16(b) by Rule 16b-3).
Once an insider has exercised stock options acquired from his corporation, it appears
there is little the corporation may do to protect the insider from whatever liability he would
otherwise incur under § 16(b). For example, Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650, 657 (9.D.N.Y.
1968), held that an issuer may not attempt "to protect its insiders from [§ 16(b)] liability by
rescinding the exercise of the stock options." Moreover, a state trial court has held, citing
Volk, that a corporation may not provide an insider with a cash bonus to offset § 16(b)
liability incurred through a cash purchase and sale of the corporation's shares. See Seilon v.
Hickman, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,557 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972). Nevertheless, issuers might at least be able to provide insiders of the corporation
with the damage limitation afforded by Rule 16b-6 if the first possible exercise date for qualified
stock options or employee stock purchase plan options is made more than six months after
the date of grant. See note 148 supra. See also Lewis v. Dwyer, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP.
No. 227, at A-5 (D. Mass. 1973) (where an insider's check mailed to the corporation pursuant
to a stock option agreement during the relevant six-month period did not arrive until the six
months had elapsed, the insider was held not to be liable for short-swing profits under § 16 (b)).
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IV. Conclusion
The scope and meaning of Section 16(b) have been expanded in recent
years to encompass an increasingly broad variety of corporate transactions. In
meeting the interpretative problems, the courts have demonstrated a commend-
able reluctance to impose liability unless it is warranted in light of the statutory
purpose. Nevertheless, many significant areas remain which require further
interpretation, and it is often difficult, therefore, to forecast with certainty the
results in a particular factual setting. Experienced counsel will ordinarily furnish
conservative advice to clients who may be statutory insiders, which, in itself, con-
stitutes a deterrent to insider trading. Such advice may now be rendered within
a legal framework which permits the evaluation of unusual fact situations.
Although Section 16(b) has come of age, its development is far from
complete. There is considerable debate concerning the continued importance of
Section 16(b) as a result of the expanding application of other anti-fraud
remedies under the federal securities statutes.190 Any sweeping change in the
federal securities laws will presumably deal with this problem, and if the
equivalent of Section 16(b) is retained, many of the current interpretative
problems are likely to be resolved by such legislation. 9 ' In addition, in both the
190 See SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). See generally A. BROMBERG,
SECURITMs LAW: FRAUD: RULE lOb-5 "(1973).
191 The American Law Institute has retained a deterrent against insider trading in its
Proposed Federal Securities Code. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). Section
1413(a), the basic liability provision, is the analogue of § 16(b). It maintains the present
purchase-sale concept by providing that "any profit realized by [an insider] from a purchase
and sale (or sale and purchase), within a period of less than six months, of securities of a class
subject to [the registration requirement of the Code] inures to and is recoverable by the
issuer... Id. § 1413 (a).
The Code attempts to clarify and rationalize the treatment of reorganization transactions
under § 1413(a). The term "sale" is defined to include "the issuance of a security pursuant
to a merger, consolidation, recapitalization, or transfer of assets for securities." Id. § 293(f).
The term "purchase" is the correlative of the term "sale." Id. § 283. It thus appears that
typical reorganization transactions would be included within the Code's definitions of "pur-
chase" and "sale" for the purposes of the basic liability provision. However, paragraph (h)
of § 1413 makes the section inapplicable to the acquisition or disposition of securities pursuant
to a merger, consolidation, recapitalization or transfer of assets for securities (including an
incidental cash sale pursuant to dissenters' appraisal rights), or an exchange pursuant to an
offer made on the same terms to all holders of securities of a particular class, if the defendant
proves that he did not use information obtained by reason of his relationship to an involved
issuer. Id. § 1413(h). Hence, if the defendant succeeds in sustaining his burden of proof,
his disposition of the securities of the acquired company in a reorganization could not be
matched with a purchase of those securities within six months prior to the reorganization;
similarly, his acquisition of the securities of the acquiring corporation could not be matched
with a sale of such securities within six months after the reorganization. The test established
by paragraph (h) appears to impose less of a burden upon the defendant than the "possibility
of speculative abuse" test of Kern. Moreover, it reflects due consideration for the "equality
of treatment" variable, discussed at text accompanying notes 74 to 80 supra.
Since paragraph '(h) deals only with the possibility that the reorganization itself might not
be deemed a "purchase" or "sale," an additional subsection of § 1413 was required to deal
with the treatment of an insider's cash purchase of the securities of the acquired company, an
intervening reorganization, and his cash sale of the securities of the acquiring corporation, all
within six months. Paragraph (g) provides that if both issuers are registrants when the
securities specified therein have more than one issuer, § 1413 applies with respect to (1) a
purchase (or sale) of a security that disappears as a result of a merger, consolidation, recapital-
ization or transfer of assets for securities, and (2) a sale (or purchase) of a security receivable
or received pursuant to the consummation of a merger, consolidation, recapitalization or transfer
of assets for securities, unless the defendant proves that under the circumstances his purchase
and sale or sale and purchase could not have lent themselves to speculative abuse. Id. §
1413(g). A "registrant" is "an issuer that has an effective registration statement [filed with
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reorganization and option areas, the SEC has the power to adopt exemptive rules,
or to clarify existing rules, so as to establish greater certainty in the application of
Section 16(b) and thus avoid the imposition of liability as a result of inadvertent
short-swing transactions.
192
the SEC], a registered investment company, or a registered holding company." Id. § 288.
Liability would thus attach to short-swing profits derived from the cash purchase and sale
of the securities of two different issuers unless an insider could negate the possibility of specu-
lative abuse. See text accompanying notes 83 to 94 infra.
The Code also attempts to provide a comprehensive framework for the recapture of short-
swing profits from insider option transactions. The Code would impose liability for ordinary
insider short-swing trading in options themselves. While this is not clear from the face of
§ 1413 (a), the Code provides that the term "security" includes a "warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase or sell" any "share in a company . . . ." Id. § 297(a). "Security"
would thus include the underlying shares of stock and put and call options issued with respect
to such shares. The Code would eliminate the current ambiguity with respect to whether
privately-issued puts and calls are within the scope of § 16(b), by substituting the phrase
"securities of a class subject to [the registration requirement]" for § 16(b)'s present language
of "equity securities of such issuer." See note 120 supra. However, because the Code's defini-
tions of "sell" and "purchase" turn upon a disposition of a security "for value," it still is unclear
whether employee options will be deemed to have been acquired "for value' if later resold.
Paragraph (g) of § 1413, in addition to dealing with the "two issuer" problem in corpo-
rate reorganizations, specifically provides for the matching of a purchase (or sale) of "a
warrant or right to subscribe to (or purchase) a security" with a corresponding sale (or
purchase) of a "security receivable or received pursuant to ...exercise of the warrant or
right," unless the defendant demonstrates that there was no potential for speculative abuse.
Because paragraph (g) is applicable only when the different securities "have more than one
issuer', an insider's transactions in the underlying security could be matched with transactions
only in privately-issued puts and calls. Thus, matching would not be available with respect to
employee stock options acquired by insiders. However, because paragraph (g) requires that
"both issuers are registrants," the matching procedure would be applicable only to private
puts and calls issued by corporations and other entities which could become registrants, and
would not be applicable to options issued by individuals. Paragraph (g) would appear to cover
the option transaction of Occidental in Kern, because the securities matched had two issuer-
registrants (Occidental and either Old Kern or Tenneco) within the meaning of the Code.
Nevertheless, the limitation of matching to the options and securities of two registrants is
particularly incongruous because the Reporter's Comment cites Bershad as an example of a
"purchase of stock and sale of option" within paragraph "(g) of § 1413. See id. § 1413, Com-
ment. In contrast, it does not appear that Bershad would come within paragraph (g) because
(1) unless the insider who granted the option therein is deemed an "issuer," there was only
one issuer (the corporation which issued the underlying shares), and '(2) if the insider is
deemed an issuer (i.e., of the option), only one issuer was a registrant within the meaning of
the Code.
192 The adoption of the speculative abuse test has considerably lessened the need for a rule
exempting extraordinary, non-cash transactions from the operation of § 16 (b).
